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Introduction  
 
On 2 October 2015 the final report of the parliamentary working group on the future of the democratic 
institutions in France was published in the French National Assembly. Its title ‘refaire la démocratie’ 
clearly indicated the great ambition of the commission. It was co-presided by the president of the 
National Assembly Claude Bartolone and historian Michel Winock, a specialist in French political 
history. The fact that Bartolone asked a historian to share the presiding chair of this group working on 
the future of French democracy demonstrates the recognition that the historical dimension is 
considered to be vital in understanding the current functioning and malfunctioning of democracy in 
France. The commission consisted of 23 members: 11 coming from both the National Assembly and 
the Senate, and the other 12 were academics such as historians, political scientists, sociologists, legal 
experts and philosophers. This multidisciplinary approach made the composition of this commission 
unique and different from preceding parliamentary working groups.  
The final report outlines the elements that are considered as the most urgent reforms in the 
organisation of French democracy. It contains seventeen concrete and rather drastic measures which 
are meant to ‘restore the connection between citizens and their representatives’.1 The objective is to 
reform the institutions of the French Fifth Republic which, according to many opinions, have become 
obsolete and suffer from a serious deficit of democratic legitimacy. The main conclusion is that the 
current political crisis has a strong link with the architecture of the French state, and that the current 
institutions are not able to adequately respond to the challenges of the present day.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 Claude Bartolone and Michel Winock, Refaire la démocratie : Rapport du groupe de travail sur l’avenir des institutions, (Paris: 
Assemblée nationale 2015) 1.  
URL: http://www2.assembleenationale.fr/static/14/institutions/Rapport_groupe_travail_avenir_institutions_ 
Historian Michel Winock (emiritus professor in contemporary history at Sciences Po) and president of the Assemblée 
nationale Claude Bartolone (Parti Socialiste) during the presentation of their report ‘Refaire la démocratie’, Assemblée nationale 
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The French Senate was one of the most important items on the commission’s agenda. It was 
concluded that ‘une modernisation du bicamérisme est aujourd’hui indispensable’.2 However, of all 
issues, it was the one that had divided the working group the most. Some members were in favour of 
the complete abolition of the Senate, others only wished to revise its role.3 The commission eventually 
reached compromise and proposed to merge the Senate with the Conseil économique, social et 
environnemental, drastically reduce its executive powers and turn it into a consultative, controlling and 
evaluating institution.4 This conclusion was particularly to the like of President Claude Bartolone. In 
January 2015, Bartolone had already stated in public that he was in favour of the complete abolition 
of the Senate. It was a statement that led to a serious quarrel with the President of the Senate Gérard 
Larcher (Les Républicains), and a renewed hostility between the two palaces of the Republic.5  
These events do not surprise. On the contrary, Bartolone joins a long tradition of Senate-critics. 
For a start, President Charles de Gaulle did not like the upper house. Not only because of the fact that 
the Senate regularly collided with the Élysée, but De Gaulle also considered it a useless and obsolete 
institution.6 De Gaulle declared a referendum for its abolition in 1969, but the vote turned out negative 
and led directly to the abdication of the president. In 1998 the former socialist prime minister Lionel 
Jospin stated: ‘une chambre comme le Sénat, c’est une anomalie parmi les démocraties’.7 In 2005, 
Jospin’s successor Ségolène Royal on her turn declared: ‘Il faudrait supprimer le Sénat. C’est un 
anachronisme démocratique insupportable.’8 More recently Front National-leader Marine Le Pen 
asserted that ‘the Senate has a more negative than a positive influence on democracy.’9 The peculiar 
fact in all these statements is that the Senate is presented by its critics as an institution that is conflicting 
with the principles of democracy. This raises questions about the origins of the bicameral system in 
France and how this area of tension between democracy and the bicameral system has emerged and 
evolved throughout the history of the French political system.  
Michel Winock concludes in the commission’s report that ‘le bicamérisme a toujours été en 
France une évidence et une problème’.10 It has been ‘une évidence’, according to Winock, because the 
                                                          
2 Bartolone and Winock, Refaire la démocratie, 100. 
3 ‘Réforme des institutions : les mesures choc du rapport Bartolone-Winock’, Libération, 30 September 2015.  
4 Other examples of the proposed reforms are: the re-introduction of one presidential tenure of 7 years, the number of 
deputies will be brought back from 557 to 400 and the senators from 348 to 200. 
5 ‘Conflit ouvert entre les palais de la République, L’Assemblée nationale et le Sénat sont durement affrontés, jeudi, par 
les voix de leurs présidents respectifs’, Le Monde, 31 January 2015. 
6 Compte-rendu Groupe de travail sur l’avenir des institutions, Séance du 17 avril 2015. 
7 ‘Interview with Lionel Jospin, Premier ministre’, Le Monde, 21 April 1998.   
8 ‘Royal met le Sénat en émoi’, Le Nouvel Observateur, 19 September 2005. 
9 ‘Marine Le Pen favorable à la suppression du Sénat’, L’Express, 9 January 2014.   
10 Bartolone and Winock, Refaire la démocratie, 100. 
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French upper chamber is the fruit of ‘reality and experience’, and it has been a ‘problem’ because it 
has never been completely sure of its stability and its future. Indeed, the Senate has constituted a central 
issue in the institutional reshufflings in France. This is mainly due to the fact that a second chamber 
seems to be in contradiction to the French tradition. The French republican doctrine strongly believed 
in a single assembly because the French unity was considered to be ‘une et indivisible’. This explains 
that the two first constitutions of France, the monarchist constitution of 1791 and the first republican 
constitution of 1793 assumed a one chamber system.11 However, a second chamber was brought into 
existence for the first time in France in August 1795 with the creation of the Conseil des Anciens. Its 
creators were obsessed with the derailing of the Revolution during the bloody period of the Terreur; a 
second chamber would function as a barrier against such tyranny. This chamber ceased to exist with 
the coup d’état by Napoleon Bonaparte on 9 November 1799. Under the Consulate (1799-1804) and 
the First Empire (1804-1814) France continued to have a bicameral system, with a Sénat conservateur to 
the example of the Senate of ancient Rome, which was an important political instrument in the hands 
of Napoleon.  
According to Michel Winock, this episode had the consequence that bicameralism was 
associated with conservatism and reactionary politics. The following decades have only accentuated 
this anti-democratic reputation with the establishment of bicameralism under the Restoration and the 
July Monarchy.12 During the Restoration (1814-1830), with the experience of the French Revolution 
still fresh in mind, even advanced liberals such as Benjamin Constant thought that a hereditary chamber 
was necessary to serve as a ‘counterweight’ to the unpredictability of democracy.13 Besides the 
argument to counterweight on the popular passions of the elected chamber, most publicists and 
political thinkers used the doctrine of a balanced constitution to legitimize the establishment of the 
bicameral system in France.14 The choice for a bicameral system, with chambers of a different origin, 
was part of a general European trend. The French system was influenced by the prestigious British 
model of a mixed government, which had become the point of reference after the fall of Napoleon in 
1815.  The legislative power was divided between the monarch, the elected Chambre des Deputés and the 
hereditary Chambre des Pairs: a chamber for the nobility to the example of the British House of Lords. 
This implied an important rupture with the revolutionary tradition; the Conseil des Anciens had been 
                                                          
11 Didier Maus, ‘Libres propos sur le Sénat’, Pouvoirs, 64 (1993) 93. 
12 Compte-rendu du groupe de travail sur l’avenir des institutions, Séance du 17 avril 2015. 
13 Henk te Velde, Mixed Governments and Democracy in 19th-century Political Discourse: Great-Britain, France and The Netherlands. 
(unpublished paper), 6. 
14 Annelien de Dijn, ‘Balancing the Constitution: Bicameralism in Post-revolutionary France, 1814-31’, European Review of 
History, 12:2 (2005) 249-268, 253. 
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elected. Nevertheless, the Chambre des Pairs failed to live up to its model. It soon became clear that it 
did not behave as an independent, aristocratic chamber capable of holding the balance between the 
king and the popular chamber.   
This explains that after the revolution of 1830, when the July Monarchy with the liberal King 
Louis-Philippe was put into place, the Chambre des Pairs was maintained in name but lost its hereditary 
element. From now on its members would be recruited among the liberal bourgeoisie loyal to the new 
citizen king. The abolition of the hereditary peers changed the aristocratic chamber into a chambre de 
réflexion. The concept of mixed government was hereby practically defeated in France.15 
These negative associations with the bicameral system explain that after the Revolution of 1848 
the republican tradition of a unicameral system was restored. Revolutionary Jules Grévy expressed the 
dominant sentiment of these days: ‘Il ne reste plus en France qu’un seul élément, l’élément 
démocratique ; il ne peut plus y avoir qu’une seule représentation, l’Assemblée nationale.’16 But the 
democratic Republic with universal male suffrage did not last for long. The coup d’état by Louis-
Napoléon Bonaparte on 2 December 1851 gave cause to the questioning of the single chamber system 
that had been in place.17 With the installation of Napoleon III’s Second Empire the political system 
was practically copied from the First Empire, including the Imperial Senate. The defeat of the Second 
Empire in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 brought a key moment for bicameralism in France.  
On 4 September 1870 the Third Republic was promulgated. However, this did not mean at all 
that the Republic as a regime was guaranteed. Between 1870 and 1875 the political situation in France 
was very unpredictable. But finally, after years of uncertainty and a political tug-of-war between 
monarchists and republicans, the Republic was eventually accepted in January 1875. The Third 
Republic had no constitution. Instead, it was founded by three constitutional laws. The central role 
was played by Henri Wallon, a history professor at the Sorbonne. He presented an amendment with 
the text: ‘le président de la République est élu à la pluralité des suffrages par le Sénat et la Chambre des 
Députés réunis en Assemblée nationale’18. The Wallon amendment and hereby the Republic was 
accepted with the difference of one single vote. The Third Republic became a parliamentary republic 
with a Chamber of Deputies and a Senate. The deputies were elected by universal male suffrage. The 
senators were selected differently: 225 senators were elected not directly by individual citizens but 
                                                          
15 Te Velde, Mixed Governments and Democracy, 7. 
16 Compte-Rendu Annales Assemblée nationale, 6 octobre 1848, cited in: Alain Chatriot, ‘Jaurès face au Sénat. La 
Chambre haute : problème ou solution pour les socialistes et les républicains’, Cahiers Jaurès, 4:174 (2004) 39-52, 39. 
17 Jean-Claude Caron and Jean Garrigues, ‘Introduction’, Parlement[s], Revue d’histoire politique, HS 9 (2013) 9-21, 16. 
18 Archives Nationales Pierrefitte-sur-Seine (AN), Manuscrit de l’amendement Wallon, Inv. Nr.  AE II 2988. 
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indirectly, by colleges in each department composed of other elected representatives such as the 
deputies of the department, members of the conseil général, and delegates from each commune, usually 
the mayor. All members had to be over forty and would serve for nine years. The other 75 senators 
were life senators (sénateurs inamovibles) chosen by the National Assembly before it dissolved.19 The 
Senate obtained unprecedented prerogatives. Although the bills had to be presented first in the 
Chamber of Deputies, the Senate had the possibility to transform itself into a High Court of Justice to 
try the President of the Republic or ministers if they were charged with misbehaviour by the Chamber.  
In 1870 the principle of universal male suffrage was pretty much uncontested in France.20 
Although the Second Republic had not lasted long, the principle of universal suffrage remained intact 
under the Second Empire; voting thus became a common experience for an increasingly large number 
of citizens.21 Even within the circles of legitimists and Orléanists, there was a large consensus around 
the legitimacy of universal suffrage. No French government dared to attack universal suffrage directly, 
and for republicans it became ‘a religion of French political life’.22   
The French Third Republic was largely ahead in this democratic movement because universal 
suffrage was far from institutionalized in the rest of the European continent.23 Historian Philip Nord 
who described the foundation of the Third Republic as ‘the republican moment’ underlines how 
exceptional this French democracy was in mid-nineteenth century Europe: ‘In 1870 France, the 
democratic movement broke through, giving rise to a new republican order. The monarchy and all its 
paraphernalia were banished. The Third Republic, as aggressive as it was in the pursuit of institutional 
democratisation, left the old elites ample room for manoeuvre.’24 If the elites were so marginalized, 
why then did the Third Republic obtain a Senate? Political scientist Yves Weber acknowledges that 
there is a profound contradiction between the processes of democratisation by the enlargement of 
voting rights on the one hand, and bicameralism on the other. According to Weber, the fact that a 
                                                          
19 See Jean-Marie Mayeur and Alain Corbin (ed.) Les immortels du Sénat 1875-1918 Les cent seize inamovibles de la Troisième 
République (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1995). 
20 Serge Berstein, ‘La synthèse démocrate-libérale en France 1870-1900’ in: L’invention de la démocratie 1789-1914, Paris, 
(Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2002) 305-360, 321. Pierre Rosanvallon, La démocratie inachevée histoire de la souveraineté du peuple en 
France, (Paris, Éditions Gallimard, 2000) 244. 
21 Sudhir Hazareesingh, From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French democracy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998) 27. As Sudhir Hazareesingh has argued convincingly, the Second Empire was a crucial 
moment in the historical construction of democratic practices in France. Napoleon III used it to support his regime with 
nation-wide plebiscites that regularly endorsed his rule. 
22 François Furet, La Révolution Française II ; Terminer la Révolution de Louis XVIII à Jules Ferry (1814-1880) (Paris: Hachette 
1988) 405.  
23 Pierre Rosanvallon, Le sacre du citoyen : Histoire du suffrage universel en France (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1992) 410. 
24 Philip Nord, The Republican moment. Struggles for Democracy in Nineteenth-Century France (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 
1995) 249. 
9 
 
Senate claims to assure a different representation than the Chamber denies the legitimacy of the 
political system.25 How was it possible that a Senate -an institution that seemed to have lost its place 
in the French political landscape and was associated with aristocracy and conservative liberalism- 
obtain a place in the institutional framework of this new republic which was so progressive and 
democratic for its time?  
In addition to this paradox, the Senate remained largely unchanged during the complete length 
of the Third Republic (1875-1940). This seems even more surprising when one takes into account the 
fact that this specific period is specially known for a broad series of political scandals that gave rise to 
an important antiparliamentarian wave, which was much more violent and desperate than that of the 
1920s and 1930s.26 This makes one wonder to what extend the Senate was a specific target in this 
turbulent period and how it did survive. Hasn’t the Senate led to any controversies in relation to 
democracy? And if the Senate was contested, what arguments were used to attack it? On what ground 
has the institution been able to preserve its legitimacy in the democratic republic? In order to get a 
better picture of all this the main question that will be central in this research is to what extend was 
the Senate of the French Third Republic considered to be compatible with democracy? 
The history of democracy in France has been extensively studied by the French historian and 
philosopher Pierre Rosanvallon, one of the world’s leading thinkers about democracy. In his inaugural 
speech at the Collège de France, Rosanvallon famously stressed that democracy does not have a history, 
but rather is a history.27 Rosanvallon describes democracy as a notion that is made of rubber; it shapes 
itself to the time. This means that if democracy has a history it lies within the consecutive forms it has 
adopted throughout time.28 Following this philosophy it is important to look at the relation between 
the Senate and democracy in the longue durée, in order to find out to what extend a development in the 
thinking about their compatibility is detectable. In his works about French democracy, Rosanvallon 
does occasionally mention that there were ‘discussions around the problem of the two chambers’29, 
but he does not explore these discussions in more detail. 
In search for an explanation why democratic institutions took root in France in the 1870s the 
research of Rosanvallon’s mentor François Furet has been trend-setting. Furet focussed on the 
evolvement of the republican ideology and has famously argued that the French Revolution ended 
                                                          
25 Yves Weber, ‘la crise du bicaméralisme’, Revue des droits public, 88 (1972) 573-602, 575.   
26 Rosanvallon, La démocratie inachevée, 378. 
27 Pierre Rosanvallon, Pour une histoire conceptuelle du politique (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2003) 17. 
28 Rosanvallon, La démocratie inachevée, 167. 
29 Ibid., 258. 
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with the installation of the Third Republic. This moment marked the victory of the Revolution over 
the Restoration.30 The problem of all French governments since 1789 has been how to cope with the 
heritage of the French Revolution, ‘how to end it’ in the words of Furet. The problem was finally 
solved in the Third Republic because here democracy and revolution were dissociated; ‘la Révolution 
française entre au port’ Furet argued.31 Furet described the success for the republicans as ‘la première 
grande victoire anti-aristocratique’ in France.32 For Furet, this victory also explains the paradoxical 
presence of a Senate in the Third Republic: the Senate ceased to be a chamber of the aristocracy and 
the republican doctrine ceased to be revolutionary; hence the Senate became a republican institution.33 
Many French political historians clearly follow the tradition of Furet and explain the existence of the 
Senate as a more or less logical result of what they label as the synthèse démocrate-libérale.34 In this view 
the Third Republic was a negotiated compromise between the moderate republicans and the Orléanist 
liberals in which the Senate was the price to pay for the Republic.35  
While Furet has presented the Third Republic as ‘the victory of democracy’, an alternative 
vision is offered by the Belgian political scientist Annelien De Dijn. With an intellectual historical 
approach De Dijn argues that although aristocratic liberalism became more marginalized in France 
after 1875, it did not wholly disappear in the context of the Third Republic.36 De Dijn demonstrates 
that the continuity between the political thought of the eighteenth century and that of the post-
revolutionary period is much more important than the discontinuity, and so the persistence of 
aristocratic elements in the French political culture. De Dijn -who focusses on France before 1870- 
finds an important confirmation for her argument in the Senate of the Third Republic. According to 
her the creation and establishment of this institution was the consequence of the fact that both 
institutionally and ideologically, the French remained interested in the idea of balance. The negative 
experience of the French with the Chambre des Pairs had stimulated French political thinkers to find 
new ways of instituting a balance in the political system that would safeguard the liberty and stability 
provided by the English model.37 De Dijn argues that the founders of the Third Republic agreed that 
                                                          
30 François Furet, La Révolution française II ; Terminer la Révolution de Louis XVIII à Jules Ferry (1814-1880) (Paris: Hachette, 
1988) 459. 
31 Furet, La Révolution française II, 467. 
32 Ibid., 467. 
33 Ibid., 470. 
34 Serge Berstein, ‘La synthèse démocrate-libérale en France 1870-1900’, in: Serge Berstein and Michel Winock, l’invention 
de la démocratie 1789-1914, 305-360. 
35 Berstein, ‘La synthèse démocrate-libérale en France 1870-1900’, 321. 
36 Annelien De Dijn, French Political Thought from Montesquieu to Tocqueville: Liberty in a Levelled Society (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) 187. 
37 De Dijn, ‘Balancing the Constitution’, 264. 
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a bicameral system allowing for the separate representation of the conservative elements of society was 
necessary.38 This would mean that the French political culture was more open to the English model 
than Furet has claimed. Moreover, De Dijn underlines that the constitution of the Third Republic 
clearly showed the distrust of its framers vis-à-vis democracy, and that the Senate was intended to 
guarantee constitutional security for the conservative forces.39 To what extend does this search for a 
counterbalance against the democratic forces explain the establishment of a Senate in the very 
democratic French Third Republic? Does this mean, as Henk te Velde argues, that the values that were 
attached to a mixed government, such as stability and balance, were gradually transferred to 
‘democracy’ at the end of the nineteenth century?40   
The existing literature about the French Senate does not provide a clear answer to these 
questions. As a matter of fact, the literature about the French Senate is rare. Apparently, the lack of 
interest in society for this silent chamber also resonates in the scientific world. The French historian 
Jean Garrigues has emphasized that there is still a necessity to study this ‘chambre trop méconnue’, 
especially during the Third Republic.41 But so far historians have shown little interest in the French 
Senate. The standard work for a very long time has been Jean Pierre Marichy’s La Deuxième Chambre 
dans la vie politique française depuis 1875.42 This book was the product of its time, published in the middle 
of the controversies between De Gaulle and the Senate of the Fifth Republic. The exhaustive study 
only briefly treats the period of the Third Republic and examines the upper house from a juridical 
perspective and therefore remains unsatisfactory for historians.  
The first complete historical study about the French Senate of the Third Republic is the first 
of the two volumes written by the British historian Paul Smith. This chronologic history of the 
institution succeeds to combine the institutional and societal element in placing the Senate in the 
historical context of the Third Republic. Paul Smith’s work is very rich and well documented, but this 
general study does not specifically zoom in on the debates about the legitimacy of the Senate. Smith 
does demonstrate that the Senate eventually became an important player in the stability of the Third 
Republic.43 For this reason the British historian Robert Gildea asserted that ‘the French Third Republic 
                                                          
38 De Dijn, French Political Thought, 185. 
39 De Dijn, ‘Balancing the Constitution’, 264. 
40 Te Velde, Mixed Governments and Democracy, 12. 
41 Jean Garrigues, ‘Le Sénat de la Troisième République (1875-1914) Réflexions sur une chambre méconnue’, Actes du 
57e congrès de la CIHAE 2006 : Assemblées et parlements dans le monde, du Moyen-Age à nos jours, 1169-1180, 1170. 
42 Jean-Pierre Marichy, La Deuxième Chambre dans la vie politique française depuis 1875 (Paris: Librairie générale de droit et de 
jurisprudence, 1969). 
43 Paul Smith, A history of the French Senate : Volume I The Third Republic 1870-1940, (Lewiston, The Edwin Mellen Press, 
2005) 221. 
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cannot be understood without an understanding of the Senate’.44 But Paul Smith doesn’t allow himself 
to dig deeper into this in his very comprehensive book.45 
As Yves Weber has underlined, the theoretical incompatibility of a Senate with democracy will 
inevitably lead to conflicts, and he adds: ‘is has varied according to country and time.’46 However, 
Weber doesn’t elaborate further on the importance of the historical and national context in the 
contestation of the democratic legitimacy of second chambers. In actual fact, this matter is often 
explained in theoretical and general terms, but rarely in the specific historical context of a country. 
Political scientists, legal experts and constitutional specialists have always been much more interested 
in second chambers than historians.47  
As a historian, Pierre Rosanvallon has a distrust for universalism and develops his philosophical 
insights by the historical way. Since Rosanvallon’s work covers specifically the history of France, he 
has the tendency to coincide the French history with the history of the western world in general. This 
raises the question to what extend the approach of Rosanvallon -studying the French political history- 
can provide conclusions of a more general nature. In order to find this out the French case will be 
briefly compared to debates about the Senate in The Netherlands and Belgium around the same period. 
These countries are geographically close to France, but both have different political traditions and 
political cultures. Putting the French case in this international comparative perspective can provide an 
understanding  to what extend the specific political context and political culture in France have shaped 
the debate about the relation between a Senate and democracy. 
This research covers the first half of the Third Republic (1870-1914). This time frame has been 
chosen first of all because this research investigates the establishment of the Senate in French democracy, 
and secondly because the First World War opened a whole new episode in the history of democracy 
                                                          
44 Robert Gildea, ‘Preface’ in: Paul Smith, A history of the French Senate : volume I The Third Republic 1870-1940 (Lewiston, 
The Edwin Mellen Press, 2005). 
45 The most recent French historical research published about the Senate of the Third Republic is Gisèle Berstein, Le 
Sénat sous la IIIe République 1920-1940 (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2014). This research on the Senate is interesting because of 
the extensive exploration of the archives of the senatorial commissions. However, the study treats specifically the 
interwar period and neglects completely the existing historiography about the French Senate. Nor does it describe the 
debates about the legitimacy of the Senate in French society. 
46 Yves Weber, ‘la crise du bicaméralisme’, Revue des droits public et de la sciences politique en France et à l’étranger, 88 (1972), 573-
602, 586. 
47 In the French case: Jean Mastias and Jean Grangé are the best examples: Jean Mastias, ‘Les secondes chambres en 
Europe occidentale: légitimité ? Utilité ?’ in RIPC, 6:1 (1999) 163-187. ; Jean Mastias and Jean Grangé, Les secondes chambres 
du Parlement en Europe occidentale (Paris: Economica, 1987).  ; Jean Mastias and Jean Grangé ‘Le Sénat français comparé aux 
autres deuxièmes Chambres européennes’, Pouvoirs, 44 (1988) 131-140. For a more general perspective: Antony Mughan 
and Samuel Patterson, Senates, Bicameralism in the Contemporary World (Cleveland: Ohio State university press, 1999). 
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and the contestation of it which had different characteristics and different consequences.48 In order to 
find pieces to the puzzle, it is first of all important to investigate how the choice for a Senate was made 
in the founding years of the Third Republic (1870-1875). Subsequently, it will be investigated how 
opinions about the Senate evolved in the first twenty-five years of the new regime (1875-1900). In the 
last chapter the same will be studied for the beginning of the twentieth century (1900-1914), which 
was a period that was characterized by the growing importance of political parties and socialism in 
particular. 
The main sources for this research will be the parliamentary records of the Chamber of 
Deputies and the National Assembly for 1870-1875.49 The debates in the Senate are less interesting in 
this context, first of all because of the fact that it was very unlikely that the legitimacy of the upper 
house was debated in the institution itself. Secondly, the primary political arena was the Chamber of 
Deputies. Besides, the Third Republic was a parliamentary Republic par excellence. The 
parliamentarian debates were notorious for their ardour and violence. According to the French 
historian Nicolas Roussellier the Third Republic was a ‘société d’éloquence’ on all levels of the political 
activity.50 This will make the parliamentary records a rich source. Nevertheless, newspaper articles and 
speeches of politicians will also be employed to find answers.  
In each chapter a short comparison between France, Belgium and The Netherlands will be 
made. In the Dutch case the main academic study about the history of the Eerste Kamer is written by 
Bert van den Braak.51 For the Belgian Senate there is the book edited by Véronique Laureys and Mark 
van den Wijngaert.52 On a particular level both publications distinguish themselves from the literature 
about the French Senate by the fact that these works extensively do discuss the debates that have taken 
place about the legitimacy of the Senate in both countries. This information provides sufficient material 
to make a comparison possible, and therefore the situation in the Low Countries will for a large part 
be sketched on the basis of this literature.  
                                                          
48 Jan Werner Müller, Contesting Democracy Political Ideas in Twentieth-Century Europe (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2011), 50-90. 
49 In the majority of the cases the source for the records of proceeding will be the Annales parlementaires compte-rendu in 
extenso des séances (consulted in the Archives de l’Assemblée nationale) instead of the reports in the Journal Officiel which are 
published the day after every session. The texts are basically the same, but the records of proceedings in the Annales 
parlementaires are revised and therefore more complete. It does occur that statements in both versions differ slightly, but 
this is rare. 
50 Nicolas Roussellier, ‘Deux formes de représentation politique : le citoyen et l’individu’, in Marc Sadoun (ed.) La 
démocratie en France 1. Idéologies, (Paris 2000) 247-331, 264. See also: Nicolas Roussellier, Le Parlement de l’éloquence. La 
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President of the Senate Gérard Larcher (left) announced that he could no longer cooperate with Claude 
Bartolone (right), president of the Assemblée nationale, because of the latter’s statements concerning the 
abolition of the French Senate. ‘Entre les présidents du Sénat et de l’Assemblée, la guerre est déclarée’, Le Figaro, 29 
January 2015. 
 
Nevertheless, this research is primarily about France. The comparison’s purpose is to place the 
French situation in an international perspective. This research does not have the pretention to give a 
complete and balanced picture of the history of bicameralism in three countries. The comparison is 
only meant to see what a quick look abroad can tell us about the importance of the specific French 
national context, and will also help to determine the specificities of the French political culture in this 
period. 
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Chapter 1   The choice for a Senate 
 
Paul Smith emphasizes that the constitution of 1875 hinged upon the Senate: ‘without it there was no 
deal’.53 The Senate of the Third Republic is often presented as the key in a political compromise 
between moderate republicans and Orléanists that resulted from the political impasse between 1870 
and 1875. The first elections of 8 February 1871 had produced a monarchist majority in the National 
Assembly and the restoration of the monarchy did not seem impossible. The Comte de Chambord, 
grandson of King Charles X was the first pretender to the throne. The other candidate was the Comte 
de Paris, grandson of the King Louis-Philippe d’Orléans of the July Monarchy (1830-1848). The 
determination of the republican leader Léon Gambetta to continue the war against Prussia didn’t do 
any good to the popularity of the republicans. However, the monarchists were unable to take advantage 
of their favourable position. Paul Smith puts it as follows: ‘monarchists had control of the hand, but 
their cards were not unbeatable and they played them badly.’54 One of the problems was that 
Chambord persisted that he would only accept to rule over France with the white Bourbon flag. 
Because of this intransigence the Republic was practically saved.  
The debates in the National Assembly about the future state structure started in November 
1872. At the opening session the provisional President of the Republic Adolphe Thiers declared: ‘La 
République sera conservatrice, ou elle ne sera pas’55 The Republic had to reassure those who feared it 
if it wished to have a future. The Senate turned out to be a reassuring element. The article of the Wallon 
amendment about the organisation of the Senate was accepted on 24 February 1875 by 435 votes 
against 234. The vote happened in a colourless atmosphere, with no enthusiasm but with a certain 
relief, because finally, after all these years, the provisional status was over. The Republic was accepted 
by the Orléanists on the precondition that its conservative character was guaranteed by a Senate.56 For 
this reason the conservative deputy De Belcastel exclaimed: ‘la constitution de 1875, c’est avant tout 
un Sénat’.57 This course of events has made historians to emphasis the idea that the Senate was the 
‘price to pay’ for the republicans.58   
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Recently, this way of presenting the origins of the Senate of the Third Republic has been 
nuanced by historians. Paul Smith emphasized that the Senate was a key to the compromise on the 
one hand, but on the other it was also an original improvisation built on France’s emerging liberal and 
democratic political culture.59 The French constitutional historian Karen Fiorentino convincingly 
elaborates on this point in her doctoral thesis, and demonstrates that the ‘Senate as a compromise’ was 
just the top of the iceberg. It was not about a compromise between two opposite political movements 
in the strict sense of the word, but they were relayed together by a moderate and realistic movement 
for which a republic based on a two chamber system was the only valid alternative. Fiorentino 
underlines that 1870 was a point of evaluation in French institutional history. After three monarchies, 
four republican regimes and two empires the time had come to reflect carefully about the causes of 
this instability. Fiorentino argues that, after 1852, amongst republicans the revolutionary doctrinal 
belief in monocameralism was questioned because it had led to dictatorships.60 Rosanvallon adds that 
the defeat of 1870 against Prussia had led to a spirit of pessimism, perplexity, moderation and self-
evaluation in France.61 As a consequence this period was characterised by the search for the perfect 
institutions.  
Whereas in 1789 priority was given to the simplicity of the institutional framework, in the 
France after the disaster of Sedan the Republicans were looking much less doctrinal for the institutions 
which suited best. This meant that the unité révolutionaire of 1789 and 1848 had to make place for a finer 
analysis of the state structure. The fact that the Third Republic rejected the vision of the French 
Revolution demonstrates the victory of the liberal and parliamentarian school over de radical school 
inherited by Rousseau. The republic would not be Jacobin anymore.62 Fiorentino’s analysis elaborates 
on the work of François Furet63 and of the British historian Sudhir Hazareesingh, and connects them 
to the Senate. Both historians have argued that the ideological and sociological alliances between 
republicans and liberals were already bearing fruit by the late 1860s. Hazareesingh points at the 
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emergence of a vibrant democratic political culture in France under the Second Empire.64 Analysing 
to what extend the republicans perceived the Senate as compatible with democracy, will support the 
analysis made by these historians. However, I will argue that the moderation of the republican doctrine 
alone does not explain why the republicans agreed with a Senate. 
Pierre Rosanvallon has underlined that two big issues which had been part of French political 
culture since 1789, came together in the 1870s: the place of the elites in society and the functioning of 
democracy.65 The Senate played a central role in this encounter. Bicameralism was an important part 
of the doctrine of the Orléanists. In the years preceding the birth of the Third Republic, the public 
debate about the legitimacy of a Senate in a new political structure was already alive. A handful of 
prominent publicists, mostly liberal aristocrats, had a considerable influence on the politicians who 
would create the constitution of the Third Republic. Lucien-Anatole Prévost-Paradol, author of La 
France Nouvelle (1868), and Duc Victor de Broglie author of Vues sur le Gouvernement de la France (1861) 
have been described as the spiritual fathers of the constitutional laws of the Third Republic.66 These 
publications all argued for a Senate in the new state-structure, but in their argumentation it becomes 
clear that the upper house was not legitimized as part of a mixed-government anymore. The idea that 
aristocracy and democracy had to be represented separately to balance the constitution was abandoned. 
A Senate was needed, following the Orléanist argument, to crude the representation of the number. 
The liberal aristocrats did not want a chamber which was against democracy, it only had to be 
moderated, balanced and organised. 
Prevost-Paradol was a member of the Académie française and his book, which has been described 
as the ‘Bible of Orléanism’, was an important reference for liberalism in France.67 His writings 
extensively discuss the advantages of a bicameral system. The first argument that is put forwards was 
the maturity of the legislative deliberations: bills which would be submitted to a double discussion 
would simply be better. Furthermore, the experience and competences of a certain number of 
distinguished civil servants and eminent men who would not be eligible for the other chamber, would 
not be lost for the public good. Finally, a Senate was considered as a very useful contre-pouvoir against 
                                                          
64 See Sudhir Hazareesingh, ‘La fondation de la République : histoire, mythe et contre-histoire’, in: Christophe 
Prochasson, Marion Fontaine, Frédéric Monier (ed.) Une contre-histoire de la IIIe République (Paris: La découverte, 2013) 243-
257. ; Sudhir Hazareesingh, From Subject to Citizen: The Second Empire and the Emergence of Modern French democracy (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1998).  
65 Rosanvallon, Le sacre du citoyen, 407. 
66 Dominique Barjot and Michel Figeac, Citoyenneté, république et démocratie en France 1789 à 1899 (Paris: Armand Colin, 
2014) 147. 
67 Gabriel de Broglie, L’Orléanisme, la ressource libérale de la France (Paris: Perrin, 1981) 328. 
18 
 
the Chamber of Deputies and as a point of support for the government, in the case the Chamber 
would ‘abuse’ its powers.68 Prevost-Paradol concluded that experience had demonstrated that a system 
of two chambers sharing the executive power was highly recommendable to nations that wished to 
govern in ‘order and stability’.69  
For Prevost-Paradol it was out of the question that this chamber would be hereditary because 
this was simply not compatible with the French democratic society: ‘l’esprit démocratique qui tend à 
détruire cette hérédité de la première Chambre, partout où elle existe encore, la détruirait à coup sûr si 
on l’imposait de nouveau.’70 A system in which the senators would be appointed was not an option 
since this would only be possible in a monarchy, and Prevost-Paradol was looking for a system that 
fitted both a monarchy and a republic, and would guarantee a democratic process. The best option left 
was election, but this process ought to be different from the elections for of the Chamber of 
Deputies.71 The Conseils régionales would form the most competent electoral corps for the election of 
the Senate because they were ‘naturellement conservateur’.72 Another proposal by Prevost-Paradol was 
the idea to elect members of the Institut de France in the Senate. This system had the advantage that 
French politics would profit from the knowledge of these people.73  
A second work that had a particular strong influence on many members of the National 
Assembly was written by Duc Victor de Broglie. In the year 1861 he had published Vues sur le 
Gouvernement de la France, which was later re-edited by his son Duc Albert de Broglie in 1871. Victor 
and Albert were both leading actors of the conservative liberal opposition to the Second Empire. 
Albert de Broglie had monarchist sympathies, but he was willing to accept a republic only if it was 
surrounded by conservative institutions. A Senate, referred to in his work as a Grand Conseil des Notables, 
was the most important precondition. For Broglie the Republic was ‘the reign of ill-educated men’74, 
and his wish was to go back to the limited suffrage of the July Monarchy. But since universal suffrage 
had become so inviolable Broglie demanded a largely appointed second chamber as the ‘representation 
of intelligence and interests’ full of civil servants, magistrates, generals and admirals.75  
A third influential author was the liberal republican Édouard de Laboulaye, a close friend of 
Adolphe Thiers and a disciple of Benjamin Constant and Alexis de Tocqueville. Laboulaye was a so 
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called ‘républicain du lendemain’; a former Orléanists who rallied to the Republic after 1848. This 
group still believed in bicameralism by doctrine.76 Laboulaye was an authority on political philosophy. 
After Louis-Napoleon’s coup d’état and the installation of the Second Empire, Laboulaye remained a 
tireless critic of the new regime’s authoritarianism and became active within the liberal opposition 
alongside Prévost-Paradol and Broglie. Laboulaye was looking for an element of continuity and 
stability because universal suffrage would cause a change in policy with every election. In order to find 
a conservative element which would guarantee such a continuity, the Senate appeared to be a suitable 
solution. For Laboulaye, the Senate was not at all in contradiction to democracy, but rather described 
it as a guarantee for a stable democracy that would last: ‘Le Sénat est la pierre angulaire de la démocratie, 
le seul fondement sur lequel on puisse asseoir un État populaire avec quelque chance de durée.’77  
Pierre Rosanvallon notes that conservative liberals like Broglie, Prévost-Paradol and Laboulaye 
had one main question on their mind: how could a ‘force brutale’ be turned into a ‘force réglée’.  This 
generation of liberals remained very careful in allowing the popular will to take full command. They 
were obsessed with ‘controlling democracy’.78 Prévost-Paradol commited suicide when he heard the 
news of the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War, but Laboulaye and Broglie would both play a major 
role in the constituent assembly between 1871 and 1875. 
Shortly after the opening session of the Assemblée nationale in November 1872, a commission 
of thirty members was elected with the primary task to prepare a constitution; the Commission des Trente. 
The commission was dominated by legitimist and Orléanist members, and consequently very 
conservative. Albert de Broglie became their rapporteur. Pierre Rosanvallon has extensively studied the 
deliberations of this commission, and demonstrated that the first sessions of the commission were 
characterised by a flood of criticism against universal suffrage.  The masses of electors, the commission 
members argued, were still too ignorant, incapable of making good decisions. However, nobody dared 
to propose to go back to a limited suffrage. It was estimated too risky to deprive the people the right 
it had acquired in 1848.79 
Moreover, despite their discomforts with ‘the power of the masses’, the conservative 
commission members regarded universal suffrage as a necessary guarantee for order and stability. 
Victor Hugo had already said in 1850 that in giving those who suffered a voting ticket, they would 
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A meeting of the Commission des Trente, Archives de l’Assemblée nationale 
throw away their rifles.80 Because universal suffrage was so undisputable, all sorts of possibilities to 
canalise it were discussed in the Commission des Trente. One member argued that: ‘Il faut donc conserver 
le suffrage universel, mais il faut le corriger, le tempérer et lui donner un contrepoids.’81 The most 
obvious ‘counterweight’ was a second chamber.82 Two successive projects arguing in favour of a 
conservative Senate were presented in name of the Commission des Trente by rapporteurs Broglie and 
Lefèvre-Pontalis in the National Assembly. 
The commission’s first project for a constitution was presented by Broglie, in which he insisted 
that the Second Chamber was a precondition for any future state. Despite some resistance from 
Jacobin republicans as Louis Blanc and Léon Gambetta, the Constitution Broglie was rather fluently 
approved by the majority of the National Assembly on 13 March 1873. For the Senate this was a rather 
important moment in the constitutional process of the Third Republic which often tends to escape 
the attention. Paul Smith has underlined with good reason that ‘from March 1873, two years before 
the passage of the constitutional laws, a majority of republicans accepted that the National Assembly 
was constituent and that the future regime would have a second chamber.’83 However, nothing was 
certain yet. It was still unclear if the monarchists would succeed in the restoration. In the meantime 
new projects were presented for the organisation of the future regime. On 4 December 1873 a second 
Commission des Trente was elected. The commission’s new rapporteur was the conservative liberal Antonin 
Lefèvre-Pontalis. He presented his report in de National Assembly on 3 August 1874. But the debates 
about this project would only take place in January and February of 1875.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
80 Ibid., 444. 
81 Ibid., 418. 
82 In 1871, Émile Boutmy referred in his motivations for the foundation of the École Libre des Sciences Politiques to the 
fact that the upper hereditary chamber had been abandoned in France. This meant that the electoral property 
‘qualification’ had disappeared completely. Therefore it was necessary, Boutmy wrote, ‘that behind the barrier of upper-
class prerogatives and traditions the democratic flood runs into a second rampart made of striking and useful merits, of 
superiorities whose prestige impose themselves, of capacities which could not be bypassed without madness.’ Cited in: 
Robert Elliot Kaplan, Forgotten Crisis The Fin-de-Siècle Crisis of Democracy in France (Oxford: Berg publishers, 1995), 108 
83 Smith, A history of the French Senate, 29. 
21 
 
The main argument of the commission in favour of a Senate was that democracy could not 
rest on universal suffrage alone because there were simply differences between people. Therefore a 
second chamber was necessary to guarantee the representation of all elements, groups and interests in 
society. Broglie argued that the power of the number could not be the only identification of national 
sovereignty. He asked the assembly ‘mais le nombre est-il tout dans la société?’84 The fact that all votes 
counted the same, would not take into acount merit, capital, intelligence and ‘tout ce qui s’élève en un 
mot au-dessus du niveau commun de la foule.’85 Universal suffrage should therefore be 
counterbalanced by the legitimate superiority of the elite, consisting of ‘tous les parvenus de 
l’intélligence et du travail.’86 Only then would the full sovereignty of the nation be represented.  Étienne 
Vacherot, who represented together with Laboulaye the least conservative wing of the Commission des 
Trente, also remarked: ‘Nous voulons tous la constitution d’une deuxième chambre. C’est là qu’il faut 
placer le correctif du suffrage universel et la représentation des intérêts et des éléments conservateurs 
de la société.’87  
Levèfre-Pontalis explicitly acknowledged that France was a democratic society.88 Furthermore, 
in the commission’s projects ‘democracy’ is clearly distinguished from ‘universal suffrage’. Their Senate 
was not formulated against democracy, but against a democracy that would be dominated by universal 
suffrage. In the session of 28 January 1875 Levèfre-Pontalis argued that a second chamber was 
necessary as ‘un contrepoids à la toute-puissance de la démocratie française, telle que le suffrage 
universel l’organise’.89 He added that without a Senate he feared that universal suffrage would become 
‘un maitre absolu, un despote’90. Univeral suffrage could easily make mistakes, especially in a country 
like France: ‘La France, cette nation aimable et spirituelle comme celle d’Athènes, se trompe comme 
les autres pays. Elles se trompe peut-être davantage, parce qu’elle est plus que tous les autres pays sous 
le coup de ses impressions du moment, qui lui donnent tour à tour les volontés les plus contraires.’91 
The rapporteur considered it therefore of vital importance that democracy would be controlled by a 
Senate: ‘Eh bien voilà cette barrière, voilà cette digue; il faut qu’elle empêche la démocratie d’être une 
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grande force déréglée, qui enlève toute sur son passage, comme un torrent.’92 In the words of Lefèvre-
Pontalis, a Senate would constitute ‘un instrument régulier de gouvernement’.93   
For Broglie, a second chamber would guarantee a ‘save democracy’:  ‘Une seconde chambre, 
c’est-à-dire la réflexion dans la délibération et le partage dans la souveraineté, (…) est parfaitement 
compatible avec toute démocratie loyale et saine’.94 However, Broglie continued, the convictions of 
the Radical republicans about democracy were indeed not compatible with a Senate: ‘c’est avec la 
théorie du nivellement absolu de toutes les supériorités (…) c’est avec cela qu’une seconde Chambre 
est incompatible.’95 Broglie tried to reassure the republicans that their objective was not to ravish 
universal suffrage, but only to undo it from its sharp edges: ‘Nous n’avons nulle envie de porter atteinte 
au suffrage universel (interruptions à l’extrème gauche), nous voulons garantir sa sincérité et sa moralité 
parfait; nous voulons une garantie quelconque de la moralité de l’électeur.’96 
Although the Senate was not legitimized as a protection against democracy, it was specifically 
presented as a protection against the menace of a new revolution: ‘nous ne nous sentons pas 
embarrassées pour le dire : c’est pour opposer au parti révolutionnaire une barrière suffisante pour 
qu’il ne puisse pas s’emparer légalement du pouvoir.’ 97  Where did this fear for a revolutionary situation 
come from? The French political scientist Julien Feydie has emphasised the important role the Paris 
Commune has played in giving the Senate of the Third Republic its legitimacy. Despite their 
differences, all members of the National Assembly had experienced the torments of the Semaine 
Sanglante which had left a constant fear for l’ennemi de l’intérieur. Feydie argues that because of this, it 
was for politicians in the 1870s just as promotional to present oneself as ‘conservateur’ as it was to be 
a ‘républicain’ in 1848.98 Feydie asserts that in all political groups, with the exception of the Radical 
republicans, there was a sincere desire to protect France durably against a new revolution. Feydie’s 
argument seems very plausible and must without doubt have played a role. However, in the projects 
and parliamentarian debates about the Senate, the Paris Commune itself is not specifically mentioned 
as an argument in legitimizing the Senate. Conservatives were more likely to make references to the 
revolution of 1789 and of 1848. Lefèvre-Pontalis, for instance, who described a single chamber as ‘un 
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instrument de révolution’,99 evoked the authority of Gérard de Lally-Tollendal. This deputy to the 
Estates-General of 1789 had in his time repeatedly submitted proposals in the constitutional committee 
for a bicameral system, however without any success. The consequences of this ignorance were 
common knowledge according to Lefèvre-Pontalis: the horrors of the bloody period of the Terreur. 
This was a history one sure shouldn’t want to repeat.100   
In legitimizing the Senate foreign examples were also gladly used. Broglie argued that all free 
and civilised countries had two assemblies.101 In the report presented by Lefèvre-Pontalis, foreign 
examples were investigated elaborately. The success of the Upper Houses of Great Britain, Portugal, 
Prussia, Austria, Hungary, Bavaria, Würtemberg, Italy, Brazil, Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark, 
Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and above all the United States, were extensively discussed. Levèfre-
Pontalis especially underlined that the United States had only reformed their federal constitution once, 
and this was for the special occasion to add a Senate to the institutional framework: ‘le Sénat, auquel 
les Etats-Unis doivent leur grandeur, est devenu la clef de voute d’un gouvernement qui a survécu et 
qui survit à tous les nôtres.’102  
The projects of the Commission des Trente endured the most vigorous attacks from politicians on 
the republican left. These republicans were labelled as ‘Radicals’ and joined the Union Républicaine led 
by Léon Gambetta. They remained true to the Revolutionary Jacobin ideal of a centralized political 
system with a single assembly. For them a Senate constituted a permanent contradiction to all 
principles of democracy. The most important argument against the Senate was that it constituted a 
violation of the national sovereignty. The Radical Alfred Naquet wrote in his book La République radiale: 
‘Il n’y a pas besoin de bascule et d’équilibre dans une vraie République, alors que la souveraineté réside 
dans la nation seule, qui n’a aucune raison à se faire contrepoids à elle-même.’103 The Radicals refused 
the idea that a Senate would have any particular representativeness since France was ‘une et indivisible’. 
A Senate would only split up the national unity. Secondly, Naquet considered the Senate to be an 
obstacle on the road to progress which had started in 1789: ‘Le Sénat que vous voulez constituer, c’est 
une pierre d’achoppement sur la marche du progrès, c’est une barrière placée en travers du chemin par 
lequel doit passer la nation française pour résoudre cette grande question qui est pendante depuis 1789 
et qu’on a appelé la question sociale.’104 
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The socialist Louis Blanc, an old veteran from 1848, had come back to France from exile in 
1870 and was elected to the National Assembly.105 While the conservative advocates of a Senate 
predicted a revolution in a political system with one chamber, Blanc on his turn feared for revolutionary 
unrest in a France with two chambers. He believed that a Senate was destined to become a place where 
the enemies of the republic could, in all comfort, organise their opposition to the government.106 Such 
a situation would inevitably lead to conflicts and ultimately to a revolution. Blanc considered it his duty 
to safe France from this type of hostilities.107  
During his exile, Louis Blanc had completed his 15-volume work Histoire de la Révolution française. 
Therefore it was not surprising that in the National Assembly he borrowed a famous metaphor used 
by the revolutionary key-figure Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès to describe the uselessness of a second 
chamber: ‘le système des deux Chambres ressemble assez à je ne sais quelle voiture fantastique qui 
aurait deux roues dont l’une irait dans un sens et l’autre dans un sens différent ou opposé.’108  
In line with his socialist colleague, the republican leader Léon Gambetta described the 
proposition for the creation of a Senate as ‘tout à fait inacceptable.’109 He asked the Assembly how the 
republicans could possibly agree with the creation of this chamber which he depicted as ‘l’horreur de 
la démocratie’110? How could a Senate resist against the will of the people? Gambetta detested ‘tous 
ces gros mots de grands seigneurs à l’adresse du suffrage universel’.111 The creation of such a ‘Chambre 
de résistance’ could only be interpreted as a ‘très-mauvais desseins contre le suffrage universel.’112 
Taking precautions against universal suffrage meant taking measures against the will of the French 
people: ‘Contre qui prenez-vous vos précautions ? Contre la France ! Contre la démocratie ! Contre le 
suffrage universel ! (Assentiment à gauche).’113 Universal suffrage, Gambetta continued, was a sacred 
good and should be at all cost defended against any form of mutilation: ‘parce qu’on ne comprend pas 
la République sans le suffrage universel; ce sont deux termes indivisiblement liés l’un à l’autre, et livrer 
le suffrage universel, c’est livrer la République!’114 
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For these reasons, Gambetta argued, it was simply impossible for republicans to accept this 
chamber that was designed against democracy: ‘Aujourd’hui on vient nous demander, à nous 
républicains, (…) à porter atteinte nous-mêmes au dépôt sacré de l’intégrité du suffrage universel et de 
préparer des armes pour une oligarchie et contre la démocratie, nous disons en toute sécurité de 
conscience, convaincus que nous sommes les véritables amis de l’ordre et du Gouvernement, nous 
disons : Non ! (Vive approbation et applaudissements sur divers bancs à gauche. – L’orateur reçoit en 
reprenant sa place les félicitations de ses amis).’115 
Gambetta was a left wing Jacobin republican, but less radical than Louis Blanc and Alfred 
Naquet. This is also tangible in their arguments against the Senate during this debate. Gambetta 
explicitly stated that he was not against a conservative republic. Moreover, he claimed that he had great 
respect for the republicans who defended this idea. However, a republic with a Senate that violated 
universal suffrage, was not the conservative republic he wanted. Moderation was needed, yes, but not 
at the price of universal suffrage: ‘Je ne comprendrais pas un régime qui se ferait sans conservateurs ; 
mais il ne faut pas qu’il se fasse exclusivement avec des conservateurs.’116 Gambetta expressed his fear 
for ‘une république qui n’a d’autre programme que de refouler la démocratie, qui ne comprends 
d’autres institutions que des institutions monarchiques.’117 It was universal suffrage ‘dans son 
universalité’ which should be the basis for a democracy in France.118 
Just like Louis Blanc, Gambetta predicted that popular protest would break out againt this 
violation of national sovereignty: ‘Une telle Chambre ne peut être le produit que de la combinaison la 
plus artificielle. Sous prétexte de résister à la loi du nombre, c’est-à-dire à la souveraineté nationale, on 
cherche à organiser un frein, un moyen de résistance : en réalité, on organiserait une cause perpétuelle 
de conflit, on créerait une cause d’excitation constante, et vous donneriez carrière à ces violences de 
langage contre les inégalités ou contre les conditions supérieures que vous voulez éviter dans la 
politique. C’est en créant une seconde Chambre, que vous donnez pour ainsi dire une cible et un but 
aux passions populaires.’119 
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Alfred Naquet argued that the foreign examples given by Broglie and Lefèvre-Pontalis were completely 
out of place. The situation in the United States or Switserland was totally incomparable with France 
mainly because of the fact that these two countries were federalist states and France a centralized 
country.120 Naquet argued that the United States and Switzerland were more or less obliged to have a 
Senate in order to keep the influence of each state balanced. He further quoted Gambetta who had 
asserted that instead of speaking about ‘Senate’, the American upper house should rather be labelled 
as ‘un congrès d’ambassadeurs des différentes fractions de la fédération.’121  Louis Blanc also referred 
to England and the United States. The reform bills, the emancipation of Catholics, the abolition of 
slave trade, the reform of criminal laws, all these measures had met the ‘passionate and sometimes 
furious resistance’ of the House of Lords. Moreover, Blanc asserted, the permanent and systematic 
involvement of the American Senate with slavery was undeniable.122  
 The moderate republicans, often républicains du lendemain, did not see any incompatibility of the 
Senate with democracy. Édouard de Laboulaye, a specialist in American history and known as the 
initiator of the French gift of the Statue of Liberty to the United States, countered the arguments of 
the Radicals about the United States. He believed that the Senate of the American Republic was the 
outstanding example of the fact that a second Chamber was perfectly compatible with democracy. He 
explicitly urged France to look at the example of the United States of America: ‘J’avoue que j’ai été 
étonné quand j’ai entendu dire qu’une seconde Chambre et la République étaient incompatibles. Il me 
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semblait que nous avions un exemple suffisant dans la grande république des États-Unis qui, 
apparemment, est démocratique.’123  
Laboulaye was a republican of the Centre Gauche, conservative republicans who supported 
Adolphe Thiers. They believed in a second chamber because experience had taught that a single 
assembly, either in a republic or a monarchy, would inevitably lead to a revolution. Laboulaye reminded 
the National Assembly that the one-chamber experiments in 1789, 1793 and 1848 had not been terribly 
successful. Again, Laboulaye pointed at the terrible consequences of the French Revolution: ‘Mais 
prétendre que l’on peut gouverner un pays, et un grand pays, avec une Assemblée de sept cents 
membres, c’est retomber dans les doctrines de la Convention, c’est vouloir en arriver au régime des 
comités, au comité de salut public, et finir par le césarisme! (Très bien très bien! Sur plusieurs bancs – 
Rumeurs sur d’autres bancs) (…) devant les leçons de l’histoire, il faut reconnaitre que la République 
ne peut vivre qu’avec deux Chambres.’124 These mistakes of the past could not be made again and 
therefore a second chamber in the new state structure would be indispensable.  
It is worth mentioning that Laboulaye’s claim that in a political system with one chamber the 
danger of caesarism would lure, was countered effectively by Louis Blanc. He pointed at the fact that 
during the coup d’état of 18 Brumaire it was in the Conseil des Anciens where Napoleon Bonaparte had 
found the support he needed to overthrow the Conseil des Cinq-Cents: ‘de sorte que c’est au système des 
deux chambres que remonte en France le césarisme.’125 Also Naquet repeated this argument in 
February 1875 in a most eloquent way: ‘Et, si je ne me trompe, l’une de ces Assemblées a 
singulièrement aidé Bonaparte à exécuter son coup d’État contre l’autre. Ainsi, l’argument historique 
tiré des constitutions de la France ne me parait apporter aucun enseignement’.126 
In his arguments for the Senate, Laboulaye presented himself as a defender of democracy and 
national sovereignty: ‘ainsi donc, c’est au nom de la souveraineté populaire, c’est au nom de la 
démocratie même que je défends le système des deux Chambres.’127 Laboulaye argued that a democracy 
would only have a future with a Senate: ‘Pour les républicains : si vous voulez que la République dure, 
que la démocratie puisse se développer, c’est à l’abri des deux Chambres ; c’est sous ce système que se 
développement peut se produire et pas autrement.’128  
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Several developments paved the way towards the acceptance of the Republic. First of all, the 
Bonapartists suddenly won more support. On 16 March 1874 the prince impérial, the only son of 
Napoleon III, turned 18 and declared that he was willing to ‘accept responsibility’. The Bonapartists 
consequently won a string of by-elections. This sudden thread for a new caesar drove the Orleanists 
and the moderate republicans closer together. Secondly, the Comte de Chambord would live until 
1883, which made an Orléanist monarchy practically impossible. Therefore Broglie was willing to 
accept a republic with a constitution that guaranteed the conservative character of the regime, and 
which held the option open for a future restoration of the monarchy.  
The road to the Republic was also facilitated by another factor; the sudden moderation of Léon 
Gambetta. The leader of the Union Républicaine realised that the Republic only stood a chance if it would 
reassure the whole of French society, and consequently moved closer towards the moderate republican 
ideology of Thiers.129 With the Republic secured, a solution for the Senate had to be found. Many 
republicans started to realise that a Senate had become inevitable. This was noticeable in Gambetta’s 
newspaper La République française. On 8 February 1875 an article still fiercely condemned the Senate, 
but suddenly, on 10 February the Senate was described in the same newspaper as ‘plus ou moins 
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utile’130. The question now was what kind of Senate this would be, how it would be elected and what 
powers it would get.  
On 11 February the deliberations about the Senate continued. Jean Pierre Marichy described 
this session as ‘assez dramatique’131. This was due to the fact that the centre-right -which had accepted 
the Republic- demanded that the Senate would maintain its conservative character. The republicans 
on the other hand, now that they had coerced the guarantee of a Republic, tried to make the Senate as 
democratic as possible in electing it by universal suffrage. The debate got an interesting twist when the 
republican Pascal Duprat proposed an amendment that senators and deputies should have the same 
electorate residing from universal suffrage. To the general surprise Duprat’s amendment passed with 
a small majority thanks to the unexpected support of the Bonapartists and the abstention of the 
legitimists. As a result the delicate alliance that had supported the Wallon amendment seemed to 
disintegrate. But the conservative provisional government did not accept the vote and the amendment 
was rejected in the third reading.  
After the vote on the Duprat-proposal the whole situation got even more complicated. The 
open discussion about the recruitment of the Senate appeared to get blocked. In order to get to a 
solution, the negotiations between the Centre Droit and the Centre Gauche were continued in secret. 
According to the classic version of the story this happened between the Orléanist spokesman Duc 
Gaston Audiffret-Pasquier and the centre-left spokesperson Auguste Casimir-Périer. Their political 
differences were attenuated by the fact that they were brothers-in-law and lived in adjoining hôtels 
particuliers. During the negotiations messages were communicated by runners through the common 
garden.132 However, Paul Smith has pointed out that in reality this was only the culmination of a long 
process begun in May 1873.133 The negotiations resulted in a compromise determining that the Senate 
would partly be elected by indirect universal suffrage and the remaining 75 sénateurs inamovibles were 
appointed by the National Assembly. On 24 February 1875, this Senate was accepted by a majority of 
435 against 234. Only 13 republicans abstained, among them was Louis Blanc.  
Paul Smith is surprised how willing the left was in accepting the compromise. There were 
‘curiously little objections’, only against the life-senators.134 Gambetta also accepted the Senate and 
became its most prominent defender. However, there is some smoke around Gambetta’s changing 
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position vis-à-vis the Senate. Why did he change his mind? In analysing the role Gambetta has played 
in the legitimisation of the Senate as a democratic and republican institution, is becomes clearer why 
most republicans had so little objections to the upper house.  
Gambetta accepted the negotiated compromise, but according to Gambetta’s friend Auguste 
Scheurer-Kestner he did not so willingly. Scheurer-Kestner’s account claims that he spend the whole 
afternoon and evening to persuade Gambetta to accept the deal.135 He eventually succeeded and the 
next morning La République française published an article in favour of the project and Gambetta 
convinced the large majority of the Union Républicaine to approve it.136 Historian Jérôme Grévy has 
already made a small side note that it is possible that Scheurer-Kestner’s account gives himself more 
credit than he actually deserves in Gambetta’s acceptance of the Senate.137 Nevertheless, this depiction 
of events implies that Gambetta was more or less forced to accept the Senate as a ‘price to pay’ to save 
the Republic. On the basis of this information Jean Garrigues draws the conclusion: ‘reconnaissons 
d’abord que le Sénat est issu d’une transaction constitutionnelle (…) le duc de Broglie a vendu au 
Centre gauche la reconnaissance de la République au prix d’un Sénat vraiment conservateur.’138 
However, the question remains how sudden Gambetta’s conversion to the Senate actually was. 
One element that indicates this question is worth asking is the fact that during the debate of 
28 February 1873 -when Gambetta expressed his fierce objections against the Senate- Laboulaye 
replied that he did not believe that Gambetta expressed his personal convictions, but the doctrines of 
the political group to which he belonged; the Radical party: ‘Je n’aurai donc pas pris la parole si 
l’honorable M. Gambetta n’était venu apporter à cette tribune des doctrines connues depuis longtemps, 
qui ne lui sont pas personnelles, qui sont celles de son parti, et que j’ai toujours considérées comme 
des doctrines qui doivent amener fatalement la ruine de la République et du pays (Approbation sur un 
grand nombre de bancs.)’139 This allegation -made in plenary session- suggests that Gambetta had 
already much longer accepted the idea that a Senate would be compatible with the democratic Republic. 
I will argue that there are sufficient clues that point in this direction. First of all because Gambetta 
would play a tremendously important role in providing the Senate with a unique republican and 
democratic legitimacy.   
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Gambetta knew that he had to explain his voters that the Republican Party had accepted the 
constitutional settlement of 1875, which included the institution he had condemned so vigorously only 
two years earlier. This was the primary objective of his speech at Rue de Ménilmontant in Belleville, a 
hill in Paris with a large workers population, often referred to as ‘the Avantine Hill of the Republic’. It 
was even more symbolical because of the fact that it was at this place where in 1869 Gambetta had 
manifested himself as the leader of the republican left during the presentation of the Belleville 
manifesto; the programme of the Republican Party. On 23 April 1875, in front of an audience of two 
thousand suspicious ears, Gambetta succeeded in presenting the Senate as a victory for democracy. 
Gambetta was an extremely talented orator. His speeches were powerful, harmonious and often 
improvised; ‘Jamais l’éloquence humaine n’a atteint une pareille véhémence et de tels sommets’ a 
contemporary observed.140 At Belleville, and other places in France, Gambetta used this eloquence to 
convince his followers that the Senate did not mean the establishment of a republican monarchy, but 
rather the creation of a valuable instrument for the promotion of democracy, the Republic and the 
nation. 
Gambetta found a new legitimacy in the communes of France by which the Senate was elected. 
Gambetta deliberately avoided to speak of a ‘Senate’ because this brought bad memories: ‘Non, ce 
n’est pas un sénat à l’usage des monarchies, un sénat à l’ancienne mode, nous avons bien d’autres 
prétentions!’141 Instead Gambetta gave the second chamber a new label: le Grand Conseil des Communes 
françaises. The communes, Gambetta argued, represented what was ‘le plus démocratique en France’, 
they constituted the very heart of democracy itself.142 This was not a newly invented argument. 
Gambetta had already preached the virtues of local democracy in his Belleville manifesto in 1869.143 
The Senate would be the representation of the small towns, the villages and the hamlets of the vast 
French agricultural territory. Gambetta explained to his audience that two parts of France had been 
living apart. Les villes and les campagnes had always regarded each other with great suspicion: ‘On disait 
alors (…) à l’électeur des campagnes (…) ton ennemi ; c’est l’ouvrier des villes, c’est lui qui empêche 
que tout marche, que les affaires aillent bien que les impôts se réduisent.’ 144 Gambetta added that this 
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was a shameful situation with very harmful consequences for the unity of French democracy and the 
French nation: ‘la démocratie républicaine est une, comme la France elle-même.’145  
Gambetta rightfully admitted that the Republic had always had its basis in the cities, and not 
in the provinces. The French peasants tended to be monarchist or Bonapartist, since these regimes 
were more likely to guarantee peace and stability than the revolutionary Republic. This explains why 
the rural voters constituted the most important support for Napoleon III, who had taken advantage 
of this by reshaping the electoral system in such a way that it artificially increased the support of the 
rural areas for the imperial government.146 Prévost-Paradol had described these Bonapartist politics as 
‘campagnocratie’ and denounced the oppression of the urban voters by a regime that was exclusively 
founded on the rural electorate.147 The elections of 8 February 1871 for the National Assembly had 
revealed an unmistakable separation between towns on the one hand, which had elected republicans, 
and the countryside on the other that had voted for the monarchists who profited from the enormously 
discredited Bonapartists. Historians agree that this vote should not be interpreted as an attachment to 
the monarchy, but as a rejection of the continuation of the war which was defended by the 
republicans.148  
In any case, this rural conservatism was a very worrying issue for the republicans since they 
believed so vigorously in universal suffrage. According to Rosanvallon, the scepticism and the 
reproaches of the republicans versus the peasants were strongly connected with the tension between 
the legitimacy of universal suffrage and the political capacity of rural people.149 The opinion of the 
French philosopher Ernest Renan is a perfect illustration of the feelings many urban republicans had 
about this: ‘J’aime mieux les paysans à qui l’on donne des coups de pied dans le cul que des paysans 
comme les nôtres dont le suffrage universel a fait nos maîtres. Des paysans quoi ? L’élément inférieure 
de la civilisation qui nous ont imposé, nous ont fait subir vingt ans ce gouvernement.’150 Rosanvallon 
explains that republicans, liberals and conservatives found each other in giving the French peasant the 
full blame for the Second Empire. The central question for the republicans in the 1870s was how to 
rally the peasants -who’s vote had clearly demonstrated their political incapacity- to the Republic?151 
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The answer was education. As François Furet has emphasized, many republicans realized that 
universal suffrage had been installed too rapidly in 1848. To take away the fear for the ignorant masses, 
universal suffrage presupposed education, and more in particular ‘political education’ which was far 
from being realised in mid-nineteenth century France.152 Since Gambetta believed so strongly in 
universal suffrage, he refused any limiting conditions imposed on it. Instead, Gambetta and other 
republicans like Jules Ferry, preferred to reduce the differences in the French electorate by means of 
education and hereby ‘enlighten’ the universal suffrage.153 Philip Nord explains that in the second half 
of the nineteenth century the republicans had a very strong pedagogical commitment to promote 
democracy: ‘republicans invited the nation to participate in a range of activities that encouraged beliefs 
and habits supportive of a democratic public life. The idea was to shape a particular kind of citizen: a 
conscientious human being who revered the philosophes and the revolutionaries of 1789. With such 
citizens, elections might be won and democratic institutions made to work.’154 These convictions were 
essential in Gambetta’s political programme of 1871: ‘Il faut se retourner vers les ignorants et les 
déshérités, et faire du suffrage universel, qui est la force par le nombre, le pouvoir éclairé par la raison. 
Il faut achever la révolution.’155  
Gambetta argued that despite the fact that the French rural population stood intellectually 
several centuries behind on the enlightened inhabitants of the cities, the rural territories could be 
conquered for the Republic.156 Gambetta believed that the Senate would be an excellent instrument to 
realise this republicanisation of the French countryside; the Grand Conseil des Communes de France would 
bring the ideas of republican democracy to every last corner of France. And as a consequence, the 
French peasant would be rallied to the republican regime: ‘le paysan sera arrivé à la véritable conception 
de sa souveraineté, ce jour-là, la République sera indestructiblement fondée. (Bravo ! bravo ! – Vives 
acclamations.)’157  
In this context Gambetta emphasized the complementarity between both chambers. The direct 
universal male suffrage that elected the Chamber of Deputies would, to a large extent, express the 
choice of the towns, while the indirect suffrage of the Senate permitted the rural areas to express more 
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authentically their political opinions. Experience had demonstrated that the candidates for the 
Chamber of Deputies were too exclusively urban and could not represent the interests of the peasants 
in a proper way. With the Senate, the French peasant would finally be represented: ‘Les villes feront 
des choix prépondérant pour la Chambre des Députés, mais c’est l’influence des campagnes qui se fera 
mieux sentir dans le Sénat pour la plus grande stabilité de la République et sans esprit de réaction.’158  
Gambetta was obsessed with the growth of the Republican party at the local level.159 He 
continuously insisted on the necessity to rally the rural masses to the Republic, without them one could 
not govern.160 Gambetta argued that now the electoral basis of the Senate lay in the communes, it 
brought politics to a new social class which in practice up until then had been excluded from it. In 
January 1876 Gambetta emphasised this advantage: ‘Ce qui se passe, c’est le transport de la politique 
dans des mains nouvelles. Jusqu’à ce jour, la politique avait été réservée à une élite plus ou moins 
éclairée, plus ou moins capable, (…) à une oligarchie jalouse.’ 161 Now politics would come within reach 
of every hard working Frenchmen, who consequently would acquire the same rights and 
responsibilities.162 Because of the Senate, the rural population would be forced to fully participate in 
politics in order to represent their interests. Consequently, the Senate became the realisation of one of 
the fundamental objectives of the new Republic: involve the French peasants in the political discussion 
and issues of a national scale. The educational element of the senatorial elections was an important 
factor in the ‘la politisation des paysans’,163 and therefore Gambetta described the Senate as ‘un école 
de gouvernement’.164 The practice of municipal democracy was a central point in the republican 
strategy for capturing power after 1871. Loyal participation in communal politics would, in Gambetta’s 
formula, enable urban and rural populations to connect themselves with the Republican party.165 The 
Senate was not only compatible with democracy, but it was presented by Gambetta as an essential tool 
to promote this republican virtue throughout France. 
The educational element was also important as a reassuring argument. Democracy no longer 
needed to be feared because people from the rural parts of France would not make the same mistake 
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as they had made in the past to vote for a caesar like Bonaparte: ‘le jour approche où la démocratie par 
excellence, la démocratie rurale, ne se trompera plus sur le choix des hommes.’166 Because of their 
involvement in national politics, peasants would stop believing the terrifying false stories -spread by 
the church- that the Republic would only cause disorder.167 
The Senate thus became the ‘rural chamber’ of France. Historian Chloé Gaboriaux 
demonstrated in her doctoral thesis that the republican perception of the rural world changed during 
the Second Empire and was reworked at the eve of the Third Republic so it could be incorporated in 
a new social and political ideal. Following this mentality, Jules Ferry had already in the 1860s pleaded 
for ‘la République des paysans’.168 
According to the French specialist of agricultural history Alain Chatriot, republicans like Ferry 
and Gambetta found in the French peasant a new model. The ‘paysannerie’, Chatriot argues, appeared 
to be a remedy in the age of expansion of democracy and as a means to settle the Republic in France.169 
Chatriot points at two elements here. The first one is often used to explain the choice for election of 
the senators by the communes, since this would guarantee the conservative character of the second 
chamber and hence the moderation of the Republican regime; the conservative countryside would 
work as a check on the ‘revolutionary towns’. This vision supports Furet’s thesis of the republican 
search for moderation and De Dijn’s thesis of the conservative search for balance. However, this 
argument does not appear in the speeches of Gambetta. The idea to moderate democracy with a rural 
chamber only reflects the arguments that convinced the Orléanists to accept the election of their 
conservative Senate by indirect universal suffrage. It was Prévost-Paradol who had already proposed 
to elect the Senate by the provincial councils  because they were ‘naturellement conservateur’170.  
A close analysis of Gambetta’s speeches reveals that the second element Chatriot points at -
settling the Republic in France- was considered as a much greater priority for the Republican Party for 
which the Senate was needed. Gambetta completely turned around the conservative argument: the 
Republican leader wanted a rural chamber in order to create a harmony between Paris and the 
provinces because it was urgent for the republicans to construct a unified democracy in France: ‘fondée 
sur la concorde et l’étroite solidarité de toutes les classes de la nation.’171 He did not want a centralist 
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Republic, but on the contrary that the communes of France would be integrated in the framework of 
the République une et indivisible: ‘je suis un défenseur de la centralité nationale. (…) Je suis pour l’unité, 
pour la centralité française.’172   
Gambetta’s defence of the Senate is completely in line with the republican doctrine of 
‘municipalism’, a notion which has been extensively studied by Sudhir Hazareesingh. This principle 
argued for the democratic self-government of the commune within the framework of a politically 
centralized state.173 Hazareesingh has demonstrated that the doctrine of municipalism had a great 
influence on the republicans in the years preceding the foundation of the Third Republic. In 1856 
Alexis de Tocqueville explained in his work L’Ancien Régime et la Révoltion the isolation of rural areas 
from politics as a consequence of Jacobin centralisation. In the 1860s and 1870s many republicans -
among them was Gambetta- had become aware of this, and decentralisation became one of the most 
important issues for the French political and intellectual elites.174 Federalists like Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon argued that the Republic should be a collection of autonomous but interacting communities. 
However, the Paris Commune in 1871 had enormously discredited the federalist-autonomists. As a 
consequence, Hazareesingh argues, ‘a moderate municipal republicanism came in command of the 
field’.175 Municipalism not only embraced the core ideals of the republican movement but presented 
itself as an important instrument in achieving its broad objectives: civil and political equality, individual 
freedom and education, secularism, democracy and universal suffrage.176 It was a creative and 
innovative attempt to modernize the  doctrines that were inherited by the First and Second Republics. 
According to Hazareesingh, ‘the attractiveness of this municipalist approach lay in its reasonable nature 
and its ability to combine elements of moderation with an ideological self-representation as the 
legitimate heir of the French revolutionary tradition.’177 It was strongly committed to the preservation 
of ‘order’, and the reconciliation with liberty. With nuances of style and presentation, municipalism 
was espoused by most of the republican party’s parliamentary and intellectual elites, as well as the 
majority of its elected local councillors.178 Paul Smith has briefly pointed at municipalism in explaining 
the republican acceptance of the Senate,179 but I would like to emphasize much more explicitly how 
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important the principle of municipalism was for the legitimisation of the Senate by the republicans as 
a democratic institution.  
First of all, by looking at Gambetta’s defence of the Senate from the municipalist perspective,  
Gambetta’s ‘sudden conversion’ does not seem that improvised as is often claimed. Although Sudhir 
Hazareesingh himself makes no mention at all of the Senate to support his claims, Gambetta’s 
legitimisation of the Senate fits perfectly in the municipalist doctrine he elucidates. Municipalism 
expressed the principles of republican citizenship which comprised values that all come back in 
Gambetta’s justification of the Senate: political participation, education, rationalism, public-
spirititedness, and patriotisim. Moreover, the municipalist republicans rejected the age-old division 
between an urban and a rural France. In the late Second Empire the Republican Party already had 
developed a well-defined notion of the state and a clearly formulated doctrine concerning its relations 
with the communes. For this reason, Hazareesingh underlines that the debate on the local liberties in 
the 1860s and 1870s is absolutely fundamental to understand the conceptions and mentality of the 
founders of the Third Republic.180 Rosanvallon also confirms that the idea of decentralisation was 
riding high at the beginning of the 1870s. Decentralisation would permit to create communities, 
organise the nation in an organic way and henceforth escape the masses of unconnected voters.181  
Municipalism also emphasized the promotion of a national feeling. Participation in the national 
political life was an essential ideological objective in the republican project. Hazareesingh argues: ‘the 
republican doctrine in the 1870s believed in fostering a sense of common identity of a democratic 
France that transcended class boundaries.’182 The municipalist notion of citizenship highlighted the 
unity of France. Active municipal life would  generate a healthy public spirit and would make individual 
citizens reason not only in terms of their own selfish interests but also with regard to the needs of 
others.183 The promotion of this spirit of  fraternity would result in an attachment to the patrie.  
Just like other European political leaders in the late nineteenth century, Gambetta hoped to 
tighten the rural populations to the nation in using national institutions and administration.184 In France 
this necessity was even more compelling because France was a pre-eminently agrarian country. In 
Gambetta’s plan, the Senate would help to shape a unified, patriotic and republican France. When he 
underlined the educational function of the Senate, it was not only meant to republicanise the peasants, 
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but also to integrate them into the French nation. The election of the Senate in the communes, 
Gambetta argued, would bring national politics to the remote French countryside.185 The fact that the 
elections in the communes would from now on also make a difference in national politics would give 
the French provincials a feeling of responsibility, and at the same time teach them about national 
politics: ‘L’examen de ces intérêts, le choix des hommes initient les conseillers municipaux à la politique 
et leur font sentir la dignité, la responsabilité dont ils sont investis, le poids dont ils pèsent dans les 
destinées de la patrie. Cette mission leur apprend, en même temps, à connaître les hommes qui 
sollicitent leurs suffrages et à comprendre la valeur de leur bulletin au jour du vote.’186 The word ‘nation’ 
had a prominent place in Gambetta’s speeches about the Senate: ‘Oui, je le dis avec joie, les paysans 
de France tiennent leurs destinées entre leurs mains, ils sont les premiers arbitres des progrès de la 
nation.’187 Gambetta’s defence of the Senate demonstrates how the republicans tried to fuse ‘republic’ 
and ‘nation’ into a single entity. 
The process of turning ‘peasants into Frenchmen’ between 1870 and 1914 has been famously 
described by historian Eugen Weber.188 Weber argued that the French countryside was for a very large 
part disconnected from the outside world, and until the late nineteenth century not integrated in the 
French nation.189 In many regions people felt little identity with ‘France’ or with people from other 
provinces. For many peasants around the middle of the nineteenth century, the nation represented 
taxes and conscription, but did not live in the hearts and minds.190 The defeat of 1870 -which 
precipitated France into the lower rank of the great powers- did not only result in an atmosphere of 
pessimism and uncertainty about France’s political institutions. It also confronted France with the 
urgent challenge to rebuild national unity, spirit and consciousness.191  In this context the Senate served 
a very urgent matter for French politicians. Gambetta’s defence of the Senate is therefore a perfect 
expression of the 1870s zeitgeist when nationalism truly became a mass phenomenon, and should 
therefore be seen in the light of French nation building. 
Gambetta believed that the Senate would stimulate a national coherent identity by interlinking 
the French communes. He regretted to see that the rural villages were separated by ‘impenetrable 
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trenches’ and consequently had ignored each other for ages. The Senate would change this because 
now the conseillers municipaux had to debate the choice of their senator with the delegates from the other 
communes in the chef-lieu du département, and this would stimulate an exchange of views on national 
politics.192 For Gambetta, this was the very essence of democracy. To describe these separated 
communes, Gambetta used the metaphor of ‘dust particles’ that were spread out on the floor. The 
Senate would glue these molecules back together again into a coherent unity: ‘cette poussière, voilà 
qu’on la prend, qu’on la pétrit, qu’on va l’agréger, la cimenter, lui donner cohésion, la force, la vie en 
faire une véritable personne morale, parlant, agissant au nom de toutes communes françaises ! 
(Profonde sensation).’193  
In this way Gambetta presented the Senate as the greatest victory for democracy. The second 
chambers in the history of France should not deter because they had nothing is common with the new 
Senate. Their political enemies had not succeeded in obtaining their conservative chamber they desired 
so much.194 Gambetta urged his audience to understand that this Republican Senate should be regarded 
as an admirable instrument of order, peace, and democratic progress; more comparable to the Senate 
of ancient Rome and that of the Republic of Venice.195  Gambetta even asserted that the Grand Conseil 
des Communes de France was a necessary component in French democracy, and added: ‘et surtout dans 
une démocratie qui veut être progressive.’196 He instilled his audience that this Senate had democratic 
powers which would give France a new political spirit. Gambetta identified democracy as the very 
principle of the Senate, its source and origin: ‘Par cette institution du Sénat bien comprise, bien 
appliquée, la démocratie est souveraine maîtresse de la France. (Très bien ! Très bien ! – Salve 
d’applaudissement.)’197  
 Gambetta urged his audience not to think lightly about this important pillar of the Republic, 
but instead take it very seriously and prepare to defend the upper house against those who wanted to 
get rid of it.198 In his speech in Grenoble in the running to the first senatorial elections, Gambetta 
announced that it was only a matter of time before the Senate would be completely penetrated by 
‘l’esprit démocratique’ -there still were 75 sénateurs inamovibles resulting from the compromise with the 
Orléanists- so it could turn itself into ‘la véritable citadelle de la République’. In doing so, Gambetta 
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predicted that everyone would kneel before the Senate of the French Republic as people had once 
kneeled before the Senate of the Republic of Rome.199 The Senate was no longer an obstacle for 
democracy. Instead, Gambetta presented it as ‘un guide sympathique’ on which France could always 
count with confidence.200 The Senate would not be the enemy of the Chamber of Deputies, but it 
would be its friend, support and control.201 
On the occasion of the communal elections Gambetta made a ‘tour de France’ to convince the 
electorate to vote for the republican candidates. Gambetta realised that the Republic could only be 
established in a definitive way if the Senate would completely turn republican as he had envisaged. 
These elections were vital for the immediate stability of the Republic, its security in the future and to 
create a ‘fixed point in the Republic’.202 In his speeches he once more underlined the fact that the 
Senate was a democratic institution. Gambetta spoke about the senatorial delegates of the communes 
as ‘les mandataires des partisans avérés de la démocratie républicaine.’203   
Most republicans agreed with Gambetta. Jules Ferry believed that if the Republic would remain 
hostile to the French peasant, it would surely be swept aside by universal suffrage.204 However, despite 
his impressive speeches held in every corner of France, Gambetta was not able to convince all his 
fellow republicans about the legitimacy of the Grand Conseil des Communes de France. Chloé Gaboriaux 
describes how the creation of the Senate revived the defiance of the extreme left republicans versus 
the French peasant in phrases that very much resembled those from the 1860s: hate for the 
‘campagnocratie’ and the hostility of the national against the rural.205 Louis Blanc described Gambetta’s 
legitimisation as the domination of the big towns by the small villages as ‘the defeat of day by night’. 
Blanc could not accept that the smallest village, with a handful of inhabitants, often backward, hostile 
to progress and political life itself, would way just as heavy as the greatest centres of light and life. As 
a consequence, ignorance would prevail civilisation.206 He spoke scandal of the enormous influence 
the Senate would have in the legislative framework: ‘La Chambre ultra-rurale pourrait dissoudre 
l’Assemblée de toute la France!’207 Radical politicians accused Gambetta of betraying the principles of 
the Revolution. 
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Historians often explain Gambetta’s sudden defence of the Senate as the moment when 
Gambetta ‘converted’ himself to the moderate republican current referred to as ‘opportunism’.208 
Because Gambetta initially manifestated himself as a Radical Jacobin republican, his sincerity is very 
easily called into question when he eventually defended the Senate. It is presented as if Gambetta, 
against his will, had to make the republicans accept this conservative chamber in order to save the 
Republic.209 This line of thoughts ignores the fact that Gambetta found in the Senate an ingenious 
solution to solve burning problems that the republicans were facing. The actual concession Gambetta 
and the republicans had to make to the Orléanists were the 75 sénateurs inamovibles, not the creation of 
a Senate itself, which had already been voted in March 1873 anyway. The life-senators of Broglie threw 
a spanner in the republican Grand Conseil des Communes de France. Historians have neglected to 
emphasized this nuance sufficiently. 
When in February 1873 Gambetta expressed his objections against Broglie’s conservative 
Senate, this was first of all motivated by the fact that Broglie legitimized his Grand Conseil des Notables 
as a barrier against universal suffrage, which was perceived by the republican leader as a sacred good. 
Léon Gambetta must have realised in 1873 that he had to accept the reality that the future regime 
would have a second chamber. The best thing to do was not resist against it, but to look for a way that 
could make the Senate compatible with democracy and undo it from its image as a barrier against the 
will of the people. Gambetta’s pragmatic character must have led him to realise that, when elected 
indirectly by universal suffrage in the communes, the Senate would be democratic and constitute a 
useful tool for the republicanisation and nationalization of the French provinces, which was the top-
priority of the republicans in the 1870s.  
However, the Republican Party heavily relied on the support of the left-wing electorate in the 
cities. If Gambetta would agree too quickly and openly with a Senate, not only the republican’s position 
of negotiation would be weakened, Gambetta would also risk his position as the leader of the 
Republican Party in seeking compromise too quickly. It can therefore be argued that in order to please 
his urban republican electorate, the very pragmatic Gambetta initially resisted to the Senate, as 
Laboulaye had claimed in the plenary session of the National Assembly in 1873. Historians have often 
pointed at Gambetta’s flexible and pragmatic political behaviour and his exceptional feeling for tactics. 
Gambetta’s biographer Pierre Barral stated that Gambetta, with his very social character, succeeded in 
                                                          
208 Berstein, ‘La synthèse démocrate-libérale en France’, 334. 
209 Jean Garrigues, for example, explains: ‘Il a fallu toute l’habileté de Gambetta, chef politique des républicains, pour 
faire accepter à la gauche ce grand conseil des notables si éloigné de la culture républicaine’. In: Jean Garrigues, ‘Le Sénat 
de la Troisième République’, 1170. 
42 
 
mobilising people around him, and accordingly was able to convince the majority of the republicans 
to accept the Senate.210 His character is described by Furet as ‘flamboyant’, ‘intuitive’ ‘eclectic’, and not 
at all ‘dogmatic or philosophic’.211 Gambetta leaned to the tradition of 1789 when he wanted to please 
the left, and to a positivist conservativism to reassure the rural population: ‘il partage à gauche la 
rhétorique des souvenirs, à droite le réalisme institutionnel.’212 Perfectly illustrating for his opportunism 
are Gambetta’s words: ‘In order to govern France, we need violent words and moderate actions’.213 
For Furet, Gambetta was the hero of the Republic because he, as the Jacobin of the government of 
national defence, became the founder of an administrative republicanism: ‘La grandeur de Gambetta 
est d’avoir su incarner une République fidèle à la Révolution, et capable pourtant d’en offrir une image 
qui en exorcise enfin la fantôme de guerre civile’.214 All these elements make it very plausible that 
Gambetta had developed his legitimisation for the Senate in a much earlier stage, but waited to play 
his card until the very last moment. This means that Gambetta’s legitimisation of the Senate in 
Belleville was not just a quick improvised selling pitch, but the expression of a firm belief in the 
democratic capacities of the upper house. 
Eugen Weber confirmed that the election of senators in the communes had indeed boosted 
the politicization of the villages, especially in combination with the election of the local mayor, who 
had been an appointed official during the Second Empire. Weber asserted that because of this 
development ‘even in remote places modern competitive politics replaced the tensions and alignments 
of the traditional world’.215 Weber cited an account of a rural doctor in 1879 who stated that ‘politics 
have been everywhere for the last few years’.216 Gambetta’s Senate did what it was designed for and 
turned out to be an indispensable vector of the republicanisation of the countryside. It was an essential 
element in what Weber has defined as the process of ‘acculturisation’; referring to the civilization of 
rural France by urban France, the disintegration of local cultures by modernity and their absorption 
into the dominant civilisation of Paris.217 However, how solid was this legitimisation? As we have seen, 
the Radical republicans did not buy Gambetta’s Senate and remained loyal to the Jacobin principles of 
the French Revolution and a single chamber system. To what extend was the Senate still perceived as 
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a ‘republican’ and ‘democratic’ institution in the last decades of the nineteenth century which were 
characterised by anti-parliamentarism and a several crises of democracy? 
 
France compared to Belgium and The Netherlands 
The debates in France between 1870 and 1875 are not fully comparable with the Dutch and the Belgian 
cases because of the fact that the ‘choice for a Senate’ was made at different moments in the nineteenth 
century. However, analysing the position of the bicameral system in an international comparative 
perspective can shine some new light on the particularities of the French situation in the 1870s. For 
the origin of the Senate in both countries one has to go back to the year 1815, when the Southern 
Netherlands, and the territory of the former Dutch Republic were united in The United Kingdom of 
the Netherlands.  
In 1813, in the power vacuum the French had left behind in the Netherlands, the Dutch 
constitutional commission made a draft that included a single chamber parliament, following the 
tradition of the Dutch Republic and the Batavian Republic.218 However, when it was decided that the 
Northern and Southern Netherlands would be united, the constitution had to be modified in order to 
match the new state structure. A new constitutional commission opted for a political system with two 
chambers in parliament and historians often argue that the Senate of the United Kingdom of the 
Netherlands was primarily the consequence of the Belgian desires.219  But the reality is more complex. 
Although the Belgian delegates indeed proposed a Senate, they met very little resistance from the 
Dutch delegates. Moreover, King Willem I quite liked the idea of a nobility chamber that would be 
filled with his supporters and protected him against the House of Representatives.  
Belgium separated from The Netherlands after the Revolution of 1830. The new independent 
state had to reinvent its political organisation. The question about the monarchy and the Senate were 
the two main controversial points of the constitutional assembly called the National Congress. The 
heavy debates about the Senate lasted three days. But in the end a large majority voted in favour of a 
second chamber.220 The discussions were of an extraordinary high theoretical level. Famous politicians 
                                                          
218 Van den Braak, De Eerste Kamer, 30. 
219 Remieg Aerts e.a. Land van kleine gebaren een politieke geschiedenis van Nederland 1780-1990 (Amsterdam: Boom, 1999) 66. 
The Dutch political historian Ernst Kossmann speaks about ‘a belgian initiative’ in: E. H.  Kossmann, De lage landen 1780-
1980 twee eeuwen Nederland en België deel 1: 1780-1914 (Amsterdam: Olympus, 1978) 102. The Belgian historian Jean-Pierre 
Nandrin ascribes the existence of the senate to ‘the strains of the Belgian delegates of the commission’. In: J-P. Nandrin, 
‘Het Belgische tweekamerstelsel in 1830-1831’ ; theoretische grondslagen’  in: Laureys, De geschiedenis van de Belgische 
Senaat, 19. 
220 Of the 190 members present, 128 voted in favour and 62 against. 
44 
 
and philosophes were quoted. Although the time period is different from the French case in 1870, the 
situation is comparable because of the fact that the question if there would be a Senate was debated in 
a constituent assembly. However, regardless of the difference in time, a striking difference is that in 
the Belgian Constitutante of 1830 the discussion was much more open and very fraternal, despite the 
differences of opinion. Belgium was a new state in the making after a victory against the Dutch, which 
strongly stimulated the atmosphere of nationalism and unity. France in the 1870s was a defeated and 
divided country with a turbulent history of many regime changes behind itself. The atmosphere in the 
French debates about the Senate was hostile, and dominated by a game for influence between the 
different parties. 
During the discussions in the National Congress everybody agreed that democracy was the 
direct representation of the people in the chambre populaire.  The protagonists of the Senate in Belgium 
perceived ‘democracy’ as a natural part of the concept of a mixed government. The liberal Jean-Baptiste 
Notomb underlined that it should be possible for democracy to express itself ‘avec turbulence, toute 
sa passion [et] toute sa spontanéité’, but there should be a Senate to stop the possible abuse of this 
freedom.221 Hence, the Senate was considered as a necessary ‘pouvoir modérateur’, in order to restrain 
the excesses of the popular representation. A Senate would form a brake to stop the inconsiderate 
proposals that were approved by the House of Represenatives. Felix de Mérode said it would be a very 
useful tool to deal with what he named ‘tentatives prématurées’.222 Many underlined the distinction 
between a ‘democratic element’ and an ‘aristocratic element’ in society that had to be rightly balanced. 
The vice-president of the Congress Etienne De Gerlache formulated the main challenge of the 
constitutional assembly as follows: ‘Il s’agit d’organiser cette aristocratie et cette démocratie de la 
manière la plus naturelle et la plus régulière possible.’223 The Catholic conservative Hubert Masbourg 
was convinced that a mixed government was ‘le principe fondamental de la nécessité d’une balance 
politique  (…) fondé sur la nature et la raison.’224 The conservative Etienne De Gerlache observed that  
‘la démocratie a sa place marquée dans la chambre populaire’. In this chamber the aristocracy would 
always be ‘en minorité et mal à l’aise’.225  
This quest for a political balance fitted perfectly in the aire du temps of the restoration period. 
Simultaneously, the French Chambre des Pairs was designed from the same ideal of a mixed government. 
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As we have seen, in the 1870s the idea of a mixed government was not mentioned anymore by the 
conservative-liberals. Instead they presented a Senate as a necessary part of democracy, not as an 
instrument which was opposed to it.  
However, not everybody in the Belgian constituent assembly agreed with the idea of a mixed 
government. Because the discussion took place during a revolution, the composition of the Congress 
counted amongst its members young, left-wing pro-French democrats. They believed that the Senate 
would inevitably lead to inequality in society. The arguments used by the Belgian democrats against a 
Senate were very similar to the ones used by the French Radical republicans in the founding years of 
the Third Republic. For instance, the democrat Alexandre Rodenbach feared that a second chamber 
would endanger the sovereignty of the Belgian people: ‘en établisant en Belgique un sénat, vous 
détruisez la souveraineté du peuple.’226 Fransman, a pro-French republican, went even further and saw 
in the Senate the establishment of despotism.227 The argument put forward by the conservatives that 
the Senate was a necessary ‘pouvoir modérateur’ was countered by the democrats in arguing that the 
Belgians were by nature a calm people, very different from the French, and would therefore not need 
a break. One of them was Jean-Baptiste Claes from Antwerp: ‘Je crois que nous n’avons pas besoin 
d’un pouvoir modérateur, parce que la modération est innée en Belgique.’228 Belgium was not to be 
confused with the chaos of the French Revolution: ‘Ils croient que les Belges vont ressembler à ces 
Français de 1790 qu’un long esclavage, un long abrutissement, une ignorance absolue des notions du 
juste et de l’injuste, avaient rendus barbares, cruels, avides de vengeances, impatients enfin de meurtrir 
des bouts de leurs chaînes ceux qui avaient été si longtemps leurs geôliers.’229  
In spite of this resistance, the ideal of a mixed government eventually won from a single 
chamber system which was considered as too radical by the majority. Foreign examples were also 
important in the choice for a Senate. References to the French Chambre des Pairs and the British House 
of Lords were dominant in the debate. But it also seems that the Belgian revolutionaries were afraid that 
the surrounding European powers would not approve a single chamber in a country that already had 
a very liberal and progressive constitution for its time. This was clearly expressed by the conservative 
Theux de Meylandt: ‘Il est certain qu’elle serait fortement désapprouvée par nos voisins, et considérée 
par eux comme constituant notre gouvernement dans un état précaire, sans garantie de stabilité.’230  
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The Belgian constitution of 1830 was a drop of democracy and the confirmation of the liberal principle 
of institutional balance and the guarantee of privileges.231   
The situation in Belgium was very different from The Netherlands. After the Belgian 
Revolution the Dutch government did not change the state-structure. According to Bert van den 
Braak, the fact that the Dutch Senate survived after 1830 was rather remarkable if one takes into 
account the experience of 1815-1830.232 In 1910 a legal-expert Gerardus van Baren came to the same 
conclusion in his dissertation on the Dutch Senate. One of his theses he formulated was that ‘a natural 
consequence of the separation of Belgium would be the abolition of the Senate’.233 But the period 
between 1830 and 1840 was a very inactive period in Dutch politics and with regard to the Senate 
nothing really changed until the constitutional amendment in 1848. Under immense pressure King 
Willem II accepted to appoint a commission of constitutional revision under the leadership of the 
liberal politician Johan Rudolf Thorbecke. It was only then that the Dutch Senate became a point of 
discussion. 
Thorbecke had initially been for the preservation of the Senate, but in 1848 he had changed 
his mind and described the Senate as ‘without basis and without any purpose’234. Thorbecke argued 
that the Senate was unable to enrich the bills that were proposed. The Senate had no productive use, 
and was therefore a waste of money. Thorbecke was a ‘doctinary liberal’. This current of progressive 
liberals believed that progress should not be obstructed by too much state-interference. This meant 
that the state should be as minimalistic as possible characterised by decentralisation and cheap 
government.235 Democracy was far from being accepted in the Netherlands in 1848. This was mainly 
because ‘democracy’ was interpreted in a much more literary sense than in Belgium and was associated 
with universal suffrage. Therefore, the wish of Thorbecke to abolish the Senate was not based on 
democratic motivations. He explicitly declared not to be a ‘democrat’, and considered people who were 
in favour of the ‘sovereignty of the people’ as ‘radicals’.236  
In 1848, the Dutch constitution was amended and it was decided to keep the Senate. There 
was only a little resistance. The liberal Van Dam van Isselt, considered the Senate as ‘a useless 
complicating factor’. Another liberal Anemaet called it ‘a dangerous institution’, because it could with 
                                                          
231 Nandrin, ‘Het Belgische tweekamerstelsel in 1830-1831’, 28. 
232 Van den Braak, De Eerste Kamer, 76. 
233 Gregorius van Baren, De plannen tot grondwetsherziening in het jaar 1831 (Amersfoort 1910) Stellingen. 
234 Johan Rudolph Thorbecke, Bijdrage tot herziening van de Grondwet (The Hague 1848). 
235 E. H. Kossmann, ‘Eender en Anders, de evenwijdigheid van de Belgische en Nederlandse geschiedenis na 1830’ in: 
Politieke Theorie en Geschiedenis (1987) 381. 
236 Van de Giessen, De opkomst van het woord democratie als leuze in Nederland (The Hague 1948) 87. 
47 
 
a very small majority reject bills that were accepted by the House of Representatives. Instead of 
regarding the Senate as a necessary brake on the passions of democracy, the Dutch liberals in 1848 
feared that the Senate would slow down the legislative process.237 This stood in contrast to France, 
where the liberal Orléanists in 1870, regarded the Senate as essential to counter revolutionary dangers 
and represent  their interests. Nevertheless, for the majority of Dutch politicians the abolition of the 
Senate was too radical. When in 1848 the power of the King had disappeared, the Senate could play a 
useful role in the new state structure as a conservative counterweight against the progressive liberals 
in the Chamber. 
 The comparison demonstrates that the choice for a second chamber was strongly related to 
time and national context. In Belgium the ideal of a mixed government was dominant, legitimising a 
Senate against democracy. In the Dutch case, where democracy did not yet appear in the politician’s 
dictionary, the heritage from the United Kingdom of the Netherlands was maintained simply out of 
conservatism. The French Senate in 1870 was legitimised by all its protagonists as ‘democratic’ and 
criticised by its critics as ‘undemocratic’. 
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Chapter 2    1875-1900:  La Belle Époque du Sénat  
 
The majority of the Radical republicans had been persuaded to vote for the constitutional laws with 
the argument that after a while, when the republicans would have gained the confidence of the whole 
country, the constitution could be amended and a real republican regime could be installed. This is 
precisely what happened. Between 1875 and 1900, the Third Republic became even more democratic. 
The elections for the Chamber of Deputies in February 1876 produced a republican triumph of 340 
seats against 155 conservative deputies. This success was for a large part due to the way the Republican 
Party was presented by Léon Gambetta; as a party true to the principles of the French Revolution, yet 
standing not for social revolution but for the hard working ‘new social strata’ of smallholders, 
industrialists, shopkeepers and white-collar workers who together increased the economic and 
intellectual capacity of the country.238 However, the very conservative President of the Republic Mac-
Mahon did not acknowledge the republican victory and kept them out of the government. On 16 May 
1877 he dissolved the Chamber, but new elections brought again a large republican majority. As a 
consequence Mac-Mahon was forced to resign on 30 January 1879. The new president was the old 
quarante-huitard Jules Grévy. This event, known as the crisis of Seize Mai, had on the one hand cleared 
the way for the republican parliamentary democracy in the following decades. However, on the other 
hand, it would only be the prelude to a period of even heavier political crises. 
The following years put in place a very different regime than the one designed in 1875. Serge 
Berstein described it as ‘the second foundation of the Third Republic’.239 The municipal elections of 
January 1878 marked a clear victory for the republicans. The majority of the small villages was 
reassured by the moderation of the Republic and elected a majority of republican mayors. This success 
had consequences for the first one-third renewal of the Senate one year later in January 1879.  The 
municipal councils elected a majority of republican senatorial delegates, who on their turn elected 66 
republican senators against 16 conservatives. The monarchist majority strongly weakened to 154 on a 
total of 300. Jean Garrigues speaks of a ‘républicaniation sénatoriale’.240 As Gambetta had promised, 
the assembly very quickly turned republican and truly became his Grand Conseil des Communes de France. 
However, this did not mean that its legitimacy was uncontested. 
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As has been demonstrated in the previous chapter, many Radical republicans did not buy 
Gambetta’s Grand Conseil des Communes de France. Nicolas Roussellier points to the fact that there should 
be absolutely no illusion about the unity among the republicans in the late 1870s and 1880s. The 
aspirations for a more direct form of democracy -which occupied an important place in the tradition 
of the ‘old’ Republican Party- had not suddenly disappeared.241 Although the Senate had become 
republican, the attacks on the upper house continued. This was also connected with the fact that the 
republican senators remained more conservative than their counterparts in the Chamber of Deputies, 
and would systematically reject a certain number of progressive bills. For this reason, the Senate 
remained an eyesore in the republican democracy for the Radicals until the end of the century.  
In the republican atmosphere of the 1880s it was the perfect moment to demand the revision 
of the constitution of 1875. In 1881, almost all Radicals in the Chamber of Deputies explicitly did so. 
Radical Georges Clemenceau presented his cahier des électeurs at Montmartre in which the first article 
demanded the revision of the constitution, abolition of the function of President of the Republic and 
abolition of the Senate.242 On 31 May 1881 Clemenceau presented with other colleagues a plan for this 
in the Chamber of Deputies. Clemenceau held an elaborate speech in which he firmly condemned the 
constitution as ‘une machine de guerre contre la République’ and the Senate as ‘un obstacle contre la 
volonté de la nation.’243 He denounced the fact that the Senate had already blocked some important 
reform bills proposed by the government: ‘Eh bien! Ces réformes que vous jugez nécessaires, comment 
les ferez-vous?’244 Clemenceau further added that the parliamentarian procedure took far too much 
time. He criticized the continues navette, bills that went back and forth from the Bourbon palace to the 
Luxembourg palace, without ever making it to Bulletin des lois.’245 Although Clemenceau also picked his 
own formulations, for a large part of his presentation he served himself by listing long citations of the 
arguments that Léon Gambetta had produced against the Senate in 1873, because according to 
Clemenceau: ‘nobody had ever said it better’246. By sheer coincidence Léon Gambetta was at the time 
the President of the Chamber of Deputies and thus chaired the very same session. This caused a rather 
awkward situation where the President had to keep order in the tumultuous Chamber, so Clemenceau 
could proceed in confronting him with his inconsistent attitude about the Senate a few years earlier. 
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The young deputy Georges Clemenceau speaks in the 
Chamber of Deputies, Archives de l’Assemblée nationale 
 
M. Clemenceau: (…) Et ceci a été démontré en termes excellents à la tribune de l’Assemblée nationale, par M. le président actuel de 
la Chambre. Je veux vous lire un fragment de son discours…(Bruit) 
M. Georges Perin: Attendez le silence! 
M. Clemenceau: Oh ! On écoutera M. le Président, si on ne m’écoute pas ! 
M. le Président : Vous avez vu que j’ai réclamé plusieurs fois le silence, mais sans succès. 
M. Clemenceau : Je crois que je discute avec beaucoup de modération. (…) Vous voyez que ce n’est pas l’avis de M. le président !247 
 
Clemenceau asked his colleagues to imagine for one moment that there was no Senate in 
France. Wasn’t it ridiculous, he argued, to believe that suddenly, the Chamber of Deputies would start 
behaving irresponsibly?: ‘Il n’y a plus de Sénat, vous êtes libres, maîtres de votre action, et le suffrage 
universel que vous représentez est délivré de toute entrave. Interrogez vos consciences; vous sentez-
vous enclins à essayer quelque nouveauté dangereuse? À bouleverser l’État? À vous jeter dans les 
aventures? On ne peut pas même poser la question sans quelque ridicule. (Très-bien ! très-bien! sur 
plusieurs bancs à gauche.)’248 Eventually Clemenceau’s proposition was rejected. The majority of the 
republicans refused to even to think about the abolition of the upper house which was now filled with 
men of their colour.  
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Nevertheless, the Senate did become more democratic. On 25 May 1884, against all 
expectations, the Senate accepted the plan for a constitutional revision and the National Assembly 
came together in August of the same year. The revision of 1884 abolished Broglie’s sénateurs inamovibles, 
but did not threaten the existence of the upper house itself. From now on all the senators would be 
elected by indirect universal suffrage in the provinces. Moreover, the possibility was created to change 
the electoral system of the Senate by simply passing a bill, without the necessity of changing the 
constitution. This meant that it would become easier to reform the Senate in the future again. The 
revision of 1884 was famously described as ‘le gouvernement définitif de la France’ because, according 
to Rosanvallon, the revision of 1884 completed the sovereignty of the people and ended the sociology 
of elitism that lay at the foundations of the institutions of the Third Republic.249 Now that all 
‘aristocratic’ elements of the upper house were completely polished away, one would perhaps expect 
that the Senate was fully accepted as a democratic institution. It still wasn’t. 
Although the reform of 1884 satisfied most of the republicans, it did not meet the expectations 
of the extreme left Radicals. They continued to demand a general debate about the institutions of the 
Republic. Instead of calming the spirits, for many Radicals the reform of 1884 was taken up as an 
encouragement to multiply their attacks on the Senate. On 2 December 1884, Charles Floquet argued 
in the Chamber of Deputies that the Radicals weren’t convinced of ‘le Sénat républican’ because it was 
still undemocratic. They considered universal suffrage as the precondition for a good functioning 
democracy, hence the election of the Senate by indirect suffrage was intolerable. For Floquet this 
election system could only be characterised in one way: ‘c’est purement et simplement le régime 
aristocratique, ou si vous voulez mieux, le régime oligarchique. (Voix à l’extrême gauche: c’est cela ! 
très bien!)’250 As a result, Floquet argued that the very principle of national sovereignty was damaged, 
which mutilated the legitimacy of all bills because the legislative power belonged only to the nation.251 
Floquet urged his colleagues not to believe in the myth of the Grand Conseil des Communes de 
France because Gambetta’s speech at Belleville had merely been one big charade. The impact of political 
words had never been more powerful he stated.252 According to Floquet, Gambetta knew exactly what 
to say to caress the ears of the popular classes that he addressed: ‘Sur ce mot on a bâti un historique 
qui est faux ou inexact, permettez-moi de vous le dire, et une doctrine qui est en contradiction avec 
tous les principes de la Révolution française. (Très bien ! Très bien !). Oui, on a bâti un historique sur 
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ce mot, et on a dit que c’est de ce jour-là que s’est développé dans le pays le sentiment politique dans 
les communes. Ah messieurs, non il ne faut pas de telles erreurs historiques. Non ! Non ! Il ne faut pas 
dire cela!’253 
Although Gambetta had defended the Senate because it would stimulate the integration of the 
peasants into the nation, Floquet accused the republican leader of abandoning the republican pursuit 
for political and national unity. The Senate, in representing the rural population, had caused a 
disintegration of this national political unity in the opinion of Floquet. France was unified by the 
French Revolution and it was therefore completely absurd to look for the political legitimacy in the 
small communes. Floquet argued that these backward places very often did not have any experience 
with an independent press, free reunions or any legislative power: ‘C’est dans ces centres minimes, où 
la vie politique ne circule qu’à peine, qu’on a imaginé de mettre la source de la souveraineté nationale 
du pouvoir législatif ! (…) et c’est du vote de ces communes que l’on avait médité de faire sortir d’une 
assemblée éternellement destinée à entraver les efforts de l’assemblée populaire. (Double salve 
d’applaudissement sur divers bancs à gauche).’254 It was a sound summary of the Jacobin objections 
against any form of decentralisation in combination with the old suspicion and disdain vis-à-vis the 
French peasant. Floquet accused Waldeck-Rousseau, the Minister of Interior who defended the project 
of reform in the Chamber, of supporting the idea of a federalist France : ‘Vous êtes un fédéraliste (…) 
un fédéraliste de la pire espèce!’.255  
What Floquet and his Radical colleagues proposed was to elect the Senate by direct universal 
suffrage: ‘cette doctrine est la vraie doctrine démocratique, et, si vous adoptez le principe contraire, 
vous êtes condamnés par toutes les déclarations que nos pères ont mises en tête de leurs constitutions. 
(Vifs applaudissement à l’extrême gauche et à gauche).’256 Surprisingly enough, the project was accepted 
by a small majority of the Chamber. Consequently, the discussion on the bill was continued in the 
Senate. But a lot less surprisingly was the fact that the government did not support it and the Senate 
rejected it.257 
In the Senate, Floquet’s project was defended by the Radical Alfred Naquet. Senator Jules Ferry 
warned his senatorial colleagues for the political strategy behind this proposal. In demanding that both 
chambers would be elected by the same suffrage, they would become identical, hence endangering the 
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legitimacy of the Senate: ‘Eh bien, le suffrage universel appliqué aux deux Chambres conduit droit à 
l’unité, et c’est parce que l’amendement de monsieur Naquet ouvrirait la porte à la constitution d’une 
Chambre unique, que le gouvernement l’a repoussé devant la Chambre des députes et qu’il le repousse 
encore ici.’258 Jules Ferry probably made a correct observation. The 1884 revision had led the Radicals 
to focus all their energy on changing the electoral law of the Senate because the path of constitutional 
revision seemed impenetrable without a political majority in both chambers. Demanding a reform of 
the senatorial recruitment was regarded as the best way to change the status quo as quickly as possible 
and, indeed, crumble the legitimacy of the Senate.  
In June 1887 the Radical Jean Labordère presented another project for the election of senators 
by universal suffrage. Labordère made no secret of the fact that his actual objective was to abolish the 
Senate, but he admitted that this was not realistic for the time being: ‘Nous sommes et nous resterons 
partisans résolus d’une chambre unique ; mais puisque le Sénat existe, il faut au moins l’organiser tel 
qu’il doit être dans un pays républicain et démocratique, lui donner comme origine le suffrage 
universel.’259 According to Labordère, this change in the senatorial electoral corps was needed in order 
to make reforms possible, but the text was rejected by the Chamber.  
In the next years, the scenario would be more or less the same. In the year before a one-third 
renewal of the Senate, a project would be presented for the election of the senators by universal 
suffrage. But in reality the revision of 1884 did not increase the chances for the Radicals. On the 
contrary. A project that envisaged to change the election system of the Senate always needed to be 
approved by the Senate itself, which was an improbable scenario without a Radical majority in the 
Luxembourg palace. Jean Bécarud, a former director of the Senate’s library, explains that if a large 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies demanded a revision of the constitution, it would politically be 
very difficult for the Senate to turn down such an initiative. But a simple bill was rejected with much 
less inconvenience. Thus, according to Bécarud, 1884 gave the Senate an extra shield against attacks 
from its critics.260 Karen Fiorentino on her turn describes the reform of 1884 as a ‘long-life insurance 
for the Senate’.261  
Between 1886 and 1889 the life-insurance of the Senate would be prolonged by an event that 
would be known as the Boulanger crisis; the first major political crisis in the Third Republic after Seize 
                                                          
258 Sénat, Séance du 7 décembre 1884, 416. 
259 CD, Séance du 27 juin 1887, 523. 
260 Archives du Centre d’histoire de Sciences Po Paris (Archives Sciences Po), ‘Jean Bécarud, le mode d’élection du Sénat 
sous la Troisième République 1884-1940 : Travaux politiques de François Goguel sur le Sénat., Inv. Nr. FG4. 
261 Fiorentino, La seconde Chambre en France, 427. 
54 
 
Mai 1877. This episode would have huge consequences for how many republicans would perceive the 
Senate. In the 1880s, France went through an economic, moral, social and a democratic crisis. In this 
context it was possible that during two years France would be captivated by general Georges 
Boulanger. As a soldier Boulanger had proven his bravery on the battlefield and quickly climbed up 
the ranks. The ambitious Boulanger got in touch with politicians like Léon Gambetta and his old friend 
Georges Clemenceau, and with their help made it to Minister of War. As a minister, Boulanger 
conducted a vigorous reform policy and became tremendously popular. Too popular for many, and 
the government started to see Boulanger as a threat for peace and stability. In the formation of a new 
government Boulanger was removed from his ministerial post. In popular public opinion Boulanger 
was seen as a victim of the corrupt parliamentary elite and his popularity increased even more. To 
regain his post at the ministry, Boulanger left the barracks and threw himself into a bold political 
adventure that lasted until the beginning of the year 1889. Boulanger won victory after victory in several 
local elections and Boulanger’s political movement reached an unprecedented scale.   
The Boulanger crisis is known as the first great moment when parliamentary democracy in 
France was in danger.262 Although there were different nuances, the Boulangists can roughly be divided 
according to the distinction made by historian René Rémond between the antiparliamentarism of the 
left and of the right in France. The left version despised the oligarchy of the parliamentarian elite which 
had been unfaithful to the sovereignty of the people and wished a more direct form of democracy. 
The right-wing conservatives, consisting mainly of monarchists and Bonapartists were against the 
downfall of principles as authority, efficiency, unity, and the place of the catholic church.263 However, 
the Boulanger affair is full of paradoxes. The political current of ‘Boulangism’ was characterised by a 
large ambiguity and many contradictions. In the words of Jean Garrigues, there were as many versions 
of Boulangism as there were Boulangists.264 The very colourful electorate had one thing in common; 
the discontent with the parliamentary regime. Although the general received most of his votes from 
the left, his campaigns were almost completely financed by the right. Boulanger manifested himself as 
a convinced Jacobin republican, and practically expressed the programme of the Radical Party.265 
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Nevertheless, he held a secret alliance with monarchists and Bonapartists who saw in the general their 
last desperate chance for the restoration of the Monarchy or the Empire.266 
Among historians there is no consensus about the political convictions of Boulanger, if he had 
any. Wasn’t the whole adventure meant to regain his post at the ministry? There are mainly two 
dominating views: the traditional -but still very dominant- version depicts Boulanger as the origin of 
extreme right movements in France of the twentieth century. His antiparliamentarian rhetoric is used 
as the main piece of evidence for the undemocratic and right-wing character of the movement. From 
the 1960s onwards, historians have come up with a revisionist view. According to this version, the 
antiparliamentarian criticism should be regarded in the tradition of the Jacobin revolutionary hostility 
towards a parliamentary system.267 In investigating the statements of Boulanger and the Boulangists 
about democracy and the Senate, the revisionist perspective is reinforced. Moreover, this focus will 
also provide a little more clarity about what Boulanger was actually against; it was above all the Senate. 
About one thing Boulanger was very clear, he was a democrat: ‘En votant pour moi, vous 
voterez pour la République démocratique’.268 Michel Morphy, author of the bestselling Boulanger 
pamphlet l’Histoire patriotique du général Boulanger, depicted Boulanger as the ‘délégué du peuple’ in the 
antidemocratic parliamentary dictatorship.269 Boulanger’s campaign programme ‘Dissolution, Révision, 
Constituante’ called for the organisation of the democratic Republic by dissolving parliament, revise 
the constitution and clean the Republic of its corrupt leaders.270 This perspective for democratic reform 
explains why the majority of Boulangists were Radical ‘dissidents’ who had left their party, the Parti 
Radical led by Clemenceau.271 Clemenceau himself broke all relations with his old friend because he 
believed that ‘popularity had come too quick for someone who loves noise so much’.272  
Boulanger attacked the parliamentarian elite and was the first to introduce the use of the word 
‘referendum’.273 Although Boulanger contested the representativeness of the parliamentary system that 
had that had been installed in 1875, the general has never declared that his objective was to abolish the 
whole system and replace it by something else. Nevertheless, the general was very clear about the 
Senate. On 4 June 1888, Boulanger defended his project to revise the constitution in the Chamber of 
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Deputies. It was a very chaotic debate, where Boulanger -who was not a gifted speaker- was intimidated 
by the constant interruptions of the deputies. Boulanger declared that in 1875 France had lacked the 
power to erect the real democratic Republic, a republic that had neither a Senate, nor a president, a 
Republic that would be ‘une et indivisible’, a republic that rested on ‘le peuple souverain’. Instead, a 
monarchist constitution had been established with only the label of the Republic. Boulanger declared 
that especially the Senate was in contradiction to all democratic principles and demanded the 
disappearance of this useless and undemocratic institution: ‘Il y a dans cette institution une dérogation 
crainte aux principes du droit démocratique qui est notre droit commun. Cette dérogation ne peut être 
maintenue. (…) Je verrais sans inconvénients et sans regrets… (Exclamations et rires à gauche) Je 
verrais sans inconvénients et sans regrets disparaitre le Sénat, qui ne représente rien et ne sert à rien. 
(Rires au centre).’274 The anti-senatorial discourse of Boulanger also resonated in the Boulangist press. 
Michel Morphy for instance described the idea that the undemocratic Senate could block all bills that 
had been passed by the democratic Chamber of Deputies as ‘absurde, impossible et monarchique… 
mais il paraît que c’est bel et bien la République.’275 
Thus, Boulanger and his followers resisted against two elements in particular: the parliamentary 
elite and the Senate. The anti-parliamentarian programme of the left-wing Boulangists was primarily 
motivated by the wish for more democracy. They did not disagree with the parliamentarian system as 
such, but specifically with the one created by the constitution of 1875. Boulangists did not plea for the 
total abolition of the parliamentary system, but for the democratic revision of it. The Senate was 
considered to be one of the greatest undemocratic obstacles and was the first thing that had to be 
moved out of the way. Left-wing republicans saw in Boulanger a charismatic and honest republican 
who had the power and popularity to realise this. This means that one could even ask if the label ‘anti-
parliamentary’ is actually correct for Boulanger and his movement; it was in any case ‘anti-senatorial’.  
Although Boulanger preached the virtues of democracy, Boulanger’s political enemies 
considered the general as a threat to the parliamentary democracy they defended. Joseph Reinach, 
director of the newspaper La République française and protégé of Gambetta, started a fierce anti-
Boulangist campaign in 1888. He expressed his concerns about the deep crisis France was going 
through and the danger that the masses would follow this new Napoleon. According to Reinach, it 
was therefore of the utmost importance to reinforce the state and form a stable government: ‘faire un 
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governement qui sauve la liberté (…) qui sauve la démocratie républicaine.’276 Republicans considered 
Boulanger as a danger for democracy. Not because his political ideas were against democracy, but 
mainly because of the fact that he aroused the memories of a new Bonaparte.  
The Senate -which had been condemned so vigorously by Boulanger and his followers- turned 
out to be the key in the protection of parliamentary democracy in France against the popular general. 
From the beginning, the upper house manifested a constant and firm opposition against the Boulangist 
menace.277 After the fall of the Goblet government the republican senators made clear that a 
government that would include Boulanger, could not count on the support of the senatorial majority.278 
Whether the Senate would support ministers or not, would completely depend on the question if they 
were with or against Boulanger. The Goblet government, of which Boulanger was part, was brought 
down by the common efforts of the Senate and the opportunist republicans in the Chamber of 
Deputies. Thereafter, the Senate completely supported the anti-Boulangist Rouvier government. And 
finally, it gave its full support to the Tirard-Constans cabinet that in the end succeeded in bringing 
down Boulanger and destroy his movement. Furthermore, the Senate played a very active role in the 
decline of Boulangism by voting all sorts of measures that put obstacles on the general’s way to the 
Élysée Palace. While in the Chamber of Deputies pro-Boulangist sounds were often heard, the Senate 
was unanimous in condemning the general whom they considered as a dangerous political adventurer. 
The Senate would also vote by a large majority the persecution of Alfred Naquet, who had defended 
the bill for democratisation of the upper house and the only senator who was directly linked to 
Boulanger.279   
On top of all this, the Senate would play a vital role in the final episode of the crisis, between 
March and August 1889. The Senate, for the first time, transformed itself into a High Court of Justice 
to sentence Boulanger for high treason. But at this stage Boulanger had already fled to Belgium. He 
was a broken man, mostly because of the fact that his girlfriend, to whom he was very devoted, had 
died of tuberculosis. On 30 September 1891, Boulanger went to her grave in Brussels where he 
committed suicide. 
Jean-Pierre Marichy argued that the senatorial opposition to Boulanger is easy to explain, 
because it seems clear that ‘l’esprit sénatorial est par principe opposé à toute aventure plébicitaire.’280 
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In this explanation the Senate simply opposed Boulanger because of the fact that the majority of the 
senators were liberal, conservative and pacifist republicans: quite the opposite of what the Boulangist 
movement represented. Karen Fiorentino underlines that the Boulanger crisis was the only case in 
which the Senate, from the very beginning, took position against what it considered as ‘a danger for 
the republic’.281 However, what has been neglected in these explanations is that the hostility of the 
Senate towards Boulanger was in the first place an act of self-defence. Paul Smith quite rightly states 
that ‘for the majority of senators Boulangism was a direct attack on them and their world.’282 In a close 
analysis of Boulanger’s statements, it becomes clear that he was certainly not against the Republic, nor 
anti-democratic, and only antiparliamentarian in the sense that he denounced the corrupt 
parliamentarian elite, and in a much more concrete way the Senate. The Senators may have acted to 
protect the Republic against what they perceived as a demagogue, but they also must have felt 
particularly threatened by his anti-senatorial discourse. Instead of merely protecting the Republic 
against Boulanger, the senators were above all protecting themselves.  
Paul Smith emphasises the importance of the Boulanger crisis for the legitimacy of the Senate 
in the republican regime. He explains that ‘in truth the trial need not have taken place before the Senate 
at all, but the government was determined to liquidate the affair before the highest political court in 
the land. The decision to do so established the Senate in the republican landscape.’283 Furthermore 
Smith adds that ‘it was only with the trial of Georges Boulanger before the cour the justice that the Senate 
cemented its place in republican hearts and minds (…) the resistance to the general was the making of 
the upper chamber.’284 Karen Fiorentino also maintains that the Senate’s firm position during the 
Boulanger affair gave a legitimation of its influence.285  
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Portrait of General Boulanger, Bibliothèque Nationale de France. 
The Senate in 1889 transformed into a High Court of Justice for the Boulanger trial. Archives du Sénat. 
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The Boulanger crisis had a profound impact on French society. The British historian David 
Watson explains that after this tremendous shock France entered a period of ‘profound 
conservatism’.286 The crisis also had a huge impact on the Radicals. Their position had become 
extremely delicate because they stood for a large part at the origins of the Boulangist movement. The 
aftermath of the affair dealt an enormous blow to the urban working-class radicalism, especially that 
of Paris. The consequence was that the bases of radicalism moved to the rural parts of France, 
especially the southern regions.287 Simultaneously the doctrine of the Radical Party was evolving 
towards the centre. Most of the Radical programme of the 1880s was abandoned, including the demand 
for the abolition of the Senate.288 This change had enormous consequences. The politicians belonging 
to the Radical current had always regarded themselves as the guardians of the integrity of the republican 
tradition. But because of the Boulanger menace, Radicals and opportunist Republicans now realised 
that they had to overcome their differences.289 Paradoxically enough, Boulanger, the general who had 
become the popular trumpet of the Radical programme that stood for democratic revision and the 
abolition of the Senate, would ultimately be an important reason for the fact that the Radicals had to 
abandon this very same programme. The young republican deputy Jean Jaurès observed the changing 
opinion of many Radicals vis-à-vis the Senate and concluded in La Dépêche: ‘le parti radical a fait du 
Sénat, transformé en haute Cour, la citadelle de la République.’290 
However, there was another reason for the Radicals to weaken their opposition against the 
Senate. Because their influence in the provinces kept on growing, it was easy to predict that their 
primary place of influence in French politics in the near future would lie in the Senate. The Radical 
leaders started to realise that the Luxembourg palace would provide a comfortable safety zone when 
popular suffrage would eliminate them from the Bourbon palace, especially in the cities where socialist 
support was growing.291 The result was that the Senate’s most fanatic critics entered the upper house 
one after another: Alfred Naquet in 1883, René Goblet in 1891, Charles Floquet in 1894, Désiré 
Barodet in 1896 and the heavyweights Georges Clemenceau in 1902, Léon Bourgeois in 1905 and 
Camille Pelletan in 1912. 
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Just like Clemenceau had changed his mind about Boulanger, he also radically changed position 
about the Senate. Later in his life he would admit: ‘At one stage in my life, when I was closer to theory 
than reality, I had faith in a single chamber, the direct representation of popular feeling. I thought the 
people were always sensible. I have changed my mind. Events have taught me that the people must be 
given time to reflect: the time for reflection is provided by the Senate.’292 Whether Clemenceau’s 
explanation was really sincere seems questionable when one takes into account the status of the Radical 
Party at the aftermath of the Boulanger crisis. The same goes for Radical René Goblet -who was the 
leader of the government in which Boulanger was War Minister- when he declared in 1894 : ‘Je ne 
discute pas de l’existence du Sénat (…) Le Sénat existe et je ne crois pas qu’il soit possible de le 
supprimer sans son consentement que je n’espère pas obtenir.’293 
Nevertheless, many Radical deputies would continue in presenting projects that aimed at 
changing the election system of the French senators. But according to contemporary observer Joseph 
Barthélémy it was easy to see that these ‘platonic declarations’ of the Radicals were only meant to keep 
up their appearances.294 On 20 October 1890 the Radical Gustave-Adolphe Hubbard submitted a 
project with the proposal to elect the Senate by universal suffrage. For the socialist and former 
Boulangist Ernest Granger this project did not go far enough: 
 
‘M. Hubbard : Nous ne pouvons pas poser les questions constitutionnelles à cette heure, mais nous pouvons examiner la loi électorale 
du Sénat. 
M. Granger: C’est la suppression du Sénat qu’il faut voter !  
M. le Président : Monsieur Granger, je vous rappelle à l’ordre.’ 295 
 
This is one of the first indications that, at the moment when the Radical deputies were lowering their 
voices about the Senate, the socialists would gradually take over this role and become the most 
important Senate-critics.  
On 16 March 1894 it was the Radical-socialist deputy Maurice Faure who presented a project 
to elect the Senate by universal suffrage. His main argument was that the Senate had slowed down 
many social reforms: ‘Des réformes politiques et sociales sont nécessaires, urgentes, ardemment 
réclamées par le pays. Nous ne pouvons les accomplir tant que le suffrage universel n’aura pas recouvré 
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la plénitude de ses droits, tant que le suffrage restreint fera prédominer dans le Sénat des influences 
conservatrices hostiles à tout progrès radical (Marques d’approbation à l’extrême gauche).’ 296 In the 
same debate an amendment was presented by Gaston Guillemet, member of the left-wing Union 
Progressiste that envisaged to elect, not the senators themselves, but the senatorial delegates by universal 
suffrage. The Chamber decided to send both projects to the Commission du suffrage universel for further 
examination. In parliamentarian commissions projects were carefully discussed and prepared for a final 
discussion in the hemicycle of the Chamber of Deputies. Following this parliamentarian procedure the 
bills would stand a better chance to get accepted. 
From this moment onwards, a new episode began in which the projects for the democratic 
reform of the Senate became part of the game of political power and interests. On 8 May 1894 a 
commission to examine the project was constituted and the Radical Georges Trouillot named 
rapporteur. However, the members of the commission were not very eager to pick up their task. For 
more than a year nothing happened. In September 1895, political commentator of the Revue politique et 
parlementaire Léon Duguit wrote impatiently that there had been no news so far from the commission’s 
progress, and that rapporteur Trouillot had not yet presented his report.297 In reality the commission had 
not yet even come together as testifies the notebook of the commission.298 To all likelihood, the reason 
for this inaction was strongly related to the political situation of that very moment. 
In November 1895, Léon Bourgeois, the first Radical président du conseil (prime minister) with 
the first exclusively Radical government, took office. The members of the Commission du suffrage universel 
were in majority Radicals. They probably realised that it would be dangerous to trouble the first 
government that was completely of their colour with such a delicate matter as the reform of the Senate, 
especially right after the Boulanger affair. Léon Bourgeois would have been forced take position in this 
matter and, if voted by the Chamber of Deputies, would be forced to defend it in the Senate. The 
chances were slim that the Senate would vote in favour of such a project, especially from a Radical 
government, and this would bring Bourgeois in a difficult position. He would then risk that his fragile 
government would be dismissed. 
But new developments suddenly brought new life to the matter. On 23 April 1896 the 
Bourgeois government was brought down by the Senate after all. The Senate had rejected Bourgeois’ 
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plans to introduce the impôt sur le revenu (income tax) which was intended to reform the French fiscal 
system, to raise the necessary revenue for future social reforms. It had been endorsed by a tight 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies, but perished in the Luxembourg palace. Consequently, 
Bourgeois attempted to govern without the Senate, but was eventually forced to resign because the 
Senate now turned down his budget for the expedition to Madagascar. This was in fact, as Paul Smith 
demonstrates, a show of force of the Senate in which it established that the upper house enjoyed the 
same prerogatives in censuring the government as the Chamber of Deputies.299  
In an atmosphere of Radical bitterness vis-à-vis the Senate, the inactive rapporteur Trouillot 
decided the moment had come to counterattack, and he suddenly deposed an elaborate report with a 
proposal to democratise the election of the Senate, three weeks after the fall of Bourgeois.300 Without 
consulting the other commission members, Trouillot had done himself the work the commission had 
never come around to do. Only a few days before the report was up for discussion in the Chamber of 
Deputies, the commission came together for the first time.301 In the meantime the commission had 
been reduced from 11 to 8 members. The secretary of the commission, Joseph Reinach, protested that 
Trouillot had deposed the report without informing the rest of the commission.302 But the other five 
members, probably Trouillot’s political friends, declared collectively that Trouillot had received a 
blanco check to write a report on behalf of the commission. Reinach stood alone and immediately 
resigned from the commission.303 It seems that, in order to cover his obscure moves, Trouillot wrote 
down in a last minute stage some improvised records of proceeding.304  
The Journal des débats also got wind of this and wrote a front page article in which it spoke 
scandal of the whole matter: ‘dans cette affaire, tout est de façade et de parade, et prend un air de 
mystification.’305 According to the journalist, this affair was very informative about the way urgent 
reforms, like that of the Senate were handled with. The article asserted that when Trouillot deposed 
his project, the notebook of the commission only included white pages: ‘Un titre sur la couverture, le 
mot « réforme » décrit en gros caractères, et, si l’on tourne le feuillet, des pages d’une blancheur 
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immaculée. Telles sont les réformes de la plupart de nos réformateurs !’306 As the article in the Journal 
des Débats quite rightly insinuated, the project to reform the Senate suddenly appeared to be a very 
convenient weapon to counterattack the senators as a retaliation for bringing down the Bourgeois 
government.307  Le Temps also drew the conclusion that other motives than the democratic reform of 
the Senate itself were behind it and described the whole matter as ‘une improvisation dangereuse’.308 
Although Trouillot’s project was heavily criticized for its inaccuracies and opportunistic 
timing,309 the majority of the Chamber adopted it with 291 against 234.310 A few days later the text was 
examined in the Senate. Here it became perfectly clear that for the Radical majority in the chamber the 
priority was not the highly hypothetical acceptation of the Trouillot-project, but above all to put the 
new conservative président du conseil Jules Méline to the test. The adoption of a bill in the Senate would 
often depend on the willingness of the government to defend it in the Luxembourg palace. The Radical 
deputies Jourdan and Millerand demanded the government by interpellation to do so. But Jules Méline, 
did not yield; the government would not appeal the Senate to accept the bill because it knew that it 
could still count on the support of the majority in the Chamber. Radical Alexandre Millerand reacted 
furiously to the arrogance of the government. But this was simply how the parliamentarian game was 
played.  
A few days later the Senate rejected the bill with 206 votes against 28.311 The newspaper Le 
Temps concluded that the project had been transformed into a war machine against the Senate and the 
government. The actual intention behind it had been far too obvious. The newspaper cited the socialist 
Édouard Vaillant who had accidentally revealed the underlying reason of this project: ‘Nous voterons 
le projet parce qu’à nos yeux cette loi est destinée à atteindre le gouvernement et le Sénat.’312 The 
conservative newspaper Le Figaro ironically wrote that Trouillot had perfectly shown that ‘there was 
no better ‘opportunist’ than a Radical.’313 The whole matter indeed demonstrates that the demand for 
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democratic reform of the Senate ceased to be a matter of principle, and instead became a weapon 
which could be used when it suited best. 
Despite the fact that the Senate had not adopted the Trouillot-project, the upper house named, 
according to the parliamentarian procedure, a special commission of nine senators which was obliged 
to examine the text voted by the Chamber of Deputies, so the Senate could then come up with a contre-
projet. But this was only another façade. The commission only came together once in December 1899 
to take the decision to let the whole matter adjourn.314 They did not even bother to name a rapporteur. 
The majority of the commission members were not re-elected as senator, and the others passed away 
during their mandate. According to the Senate’s regulations, these members had to be replaced. But 
instead of replacing all of the nine members, it was decided to put the 86-year-old senator Émile de 
Marcère, the last living life-senator alone on the commission. When he passed away in 1918 the 
commission, twenty-two years after its creation, literary died a silent death.315 This course of events 
perfectly demonstrates how the Senate protected itself against possible reforms that were intended for 
its democratisation or abolition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The fall of the Bourgeois government was a major political crisis. Because the Senate had played such 
a hard game, it provoked a wave of anti-Senate reactions. The evening after Bourgeois’ resignation a 
massive protest meeting was organised in a music-hall near the Place de la République. According to 
a police report, the announced purpose of the meeting was to protest against the Senate and 
demonstrate in favour of universal suffrage and the democratic Republic.316 It had been a long time 
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since Paris had seen a protest meeting of this scale. According to newspaper reports around 8.000 
people were packed into the hall and a total of 20.000 people gathered at Place de la République and 
the surrounding boulevards. The crowd shouted without interruption: ‘A bas le Sénat!’, and other 
rallying-cries as ‘Vive la révision! Vive la République sociale! Vive la Révolution!’317 The horses of the 
police charged the huge crowd that continued to shout ‘À bas le Sénat! Vive le suffrage universel!’318 
Also the square of the Sorbonne university was packed with hundreds of students shouting ‘A bas le 
Sénat!’ Only a police intervention could prevent the student-crowd to move to the Luxembourg palace, 
only a few blocks away.319  
 Jean Jaurès, who had returned in the Chamber as a socialist deputy, and the Radical Camille 
Pelletan were among the crowd that evening and tried to address the cheering people. Jaurès used 
revolutionary rhetoric in condemning the Senate. The socialist stated that this was not an empty 
demonstration, but the beginning of a fight. Dramatically, he asked the crowd to swear an oath to the 
social republic. The crowd responded massively to do so.320 Jaurès continued ironically that everyone 
should be grateful to the senators, because with their actions they had brought the revolution only 
closer: ‘Nous devons les remercier, tous ces réacteurs et tous ces corrompus. Ils ont, par leur attitude, 
fait un grand pas à la Révolution.’321 Camille Pelletan described the situation as a fight between limited 
and universal suffrage. According to the Radical deputy, the Senate was ‘une maison de retraite (…) 
où tous sont des malades, d’anciens hommes politiques qui désirent avoir du repos’322 It was this 
retirement home that had stopped the progress which was set in motion.   
In this revolutionary atmosphere, moderate republican and right-wing newspapers defended 
the Senate. Le Figaro declared Camille Pelletan to be a hypocrite because his father Eugène Pelletan 
had been a life-senator until 1884. In defence of the Senate it was argued that the upper house was 
elected by universal suffrage (although indirectly) and therefore just as democratic as the Chamber of 
Deputies.323 In Le Temps of 27 April 1896 Jules Ferry kept defending the Senate as ‘le pillier fondamental 
de notre organisation républicaine.’324 
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The event caused a revival of the debate about the Senate. The sessions of 16 and 17 November 
1896 constituted the most important and profound debates about the legitimacy of the Senate during 
the Third Republic. To a large extent the argumentation was familiar and was focussed on the claim 
that the elections of the Senate were not democratic enough. Nationalist deputy Gauthier de Clagny 
declared that the Senate was against all instincts of democracy, its electoral system was a scandal and 
this could no longer continue.325 Maurice Faure regretted the fact that a democratic reform had been 
systematically refused under the pretext that it would endanger the republican order.326 Maurice Faure 
asked his colleagues, in the name of national sovereignty, to vote for a further democratisation of the 
Senate.327  
Gaston Guillemet put forward that the elections of the Senate were full of corruption and 
therefore undemocratic. In January 1876, Gambetta had already expressed his preoccupations about 
the sensitivity of corruption of the senatorial delegates.328 Now Guillemet argued that according to his 
information in some communes the conseillers municipaux had worked out a system of selection by 
rotation or by lottery: ‘Après les dernières élections sénatoriales je demandais à un maire républicain 
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pourquoi il n’avait pas été nommé délégué ; il me répondit : Ce n’était pas mon tour !’329 There was 
much hilarity in the Chamber when Gauthier de Glagny compared this system to the Conférence Molé-
Tocqueville, a well-known French debating society where the role of president was played in turns. 
But Guillemet was serious and stated that this undemocratic scandal had to be stopped.330 
However, there were other, more original sounds in this debate. Some deputies began to 
wonder how the Senate could play a role in the improvement of the representativeness of the 
parliamentary democracy. The most remarkable proposal was a project presented by Abbé Lemire, a 
Christian-democrat deputy and a priest from Hazebrouck in French Flanders. Lemire agreed with the 
argument of his colleagues that the only thing the Senate had done was causing delay in important 
legislation. In March 1894 he had already demanded the abolition of the Senate: ‘A mes yeux, le point 
le plus important est la suppression du Sénat tel qu’il est aujourd’hui (applaudissement à l’extrême 
gauche).’331 This did not mean that he was a partisan of a political system with a single assembly. His 
plan was to construct a new Senate in which different professional groups in society were represented, 
a system known in French as la représentation des intérêts. Lemire told his colleagues: ‘Cette Assemblée 
mettrait à côté de la représentation numérique que nous avons la représentation professionnelle que 
nous n’avons point et qu’on demande de toutes parts. L’une contrôlerait l’autre ; et nous aurions de la 
sorte une constitution vraiment démocratique.’332  
Lemire envisaged a system in which the senatorial delegates were to be nominated by three 
professional groups: the agricultural sector, the industry, commerce, transports, and liberal professions. 
Such a Senate would make French society more democratic: ‘l’idée de faire nommer le Sénat par les 
représentants de toutes corporations, des corps constitués, des syndicats, des associations de toute 
sorte, repose précisément sur une doctrine et représente une réforme vraiment démocratique.’333 
Lemire tried to convince his colleagues that this was a much more democratic idea than to elect the 
Senate by universal suffrage, which would make the Senate a useless copy of the Chamber. Lemire was 
convinced that universal suffrage could only be the basis of one chamber. Two chambers which were 
both elected by universal suffrage would tear apart the national representation. Probably in order to 
satisfy the conservatives, Lemire stated that the representation of interests would also function as a 
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brake on the passions of the Chamber of Deputies: ‘ce qu’il faut, ce n’est pas une locomotive, c’est un 
frein. Et ce frein je le trouve dans la représentation professionnelle.’334   
The main idea behind Abbé Lemire’s project was to ameliorate the representation of French 
society. Lemire accepted the principle of universal suffrage, but had difficulties with the individualist 
and liberal character of it. In his speech in Lyon in 1896 the priest condemned universal suffrage that 
put on the same level ‘le célibataire égoïste isolé’ and the ‘chef de famille’.335 Pierre Rosanvallon 
underlines that the project by Abbé Lemire marked the first moment when in France the individualist 
perception of representation was technically disputed in an institution of the Republic.336 
Rapporteur Trouillot refused to take Lemire’s project into consideration and there was no 
majority for it in the Chamber. Nevertheless, there are several indications that suggest that the ideas 
about professional representation were not only the individual expressions of nostalgic corporatist 
feelings of a priest from French Flanders. Quite the opposite, the idea to give the Senate a new 
legitimacy as the house where the interests of societal groups were represented was widely spread in 
the 1890s.  The republican deputy Paul Deschanel -who defended the status quo- remarked: ‘Peut-être 
y-a-t-il une vue juste, une vue d’avenir, dans cette conception qui consiste à donner une part dans la 
représentation nationale, non seulement aux individus, aux personnes éphémères, mais aussi aux 
personnes morales, à ces corps organisés, à ces groupes sociaux intermédiaires entre l’individu et l’État, 
qui sont la meilleure garantie de la liberté politique.’337 Lemire also referred to the authority of Henri 
Maret, a Radical who had defended the idea of representation of interests because he did not believe 
that a Chamber exclusively filled with ambitious solicitors could represent the nation adequately.338 
Jean Jaurès had also been attracted to the idea, already in the 1880s. But contrary to Lemire, 
Jaurès initially remained loyal to the revolutionary ideal of a single chamber. He proposed a system of 
double deliberation in the Chamber of Deputies. In the interval between the two sessions, different 
organs of the political and social life in France were to be consulted. Hereby he meant the chambers 
of commerce, agriculture, the organisations of the workers and that of the employers: ‘toutes les 
associations politiques fonctionnant en pleine liberté seraient consultés.’339   
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However, in January 1889 Jaurès changed his mind and believed that there was a future for 
bicameralism in France: ‘Beaucoup d’esprits croient à la nécessité de deux chambres, et j’arrive à penser 
qu’à condition de leur régler leurs attributions respectives et de dénouer rapidement les conflits, elles 
sont utiles.’340 Jaurès’ changing position vis-à-vis the Senate in 1889 was most probably related to the 
Boulanger crisis. But it should also be noted that Jaurès was the protégé of Jules Ferry who was a fierce 
defender of the Republican Senate. Between January 1889 and October 1890 Jaurès worked out his 
ideas about professional representation in a series of articles in La Dépêche with the revealing title ‘La 
Chambre du travail’.341  This concept was very close to Abbé Lemire’s project. Jaurès proposed to elect 
this second chamber by suffrage professionnel, with a subdivision of the working world in agricultural, 
industrial and commercial categories. In La Dépêche of 13 January 1889 Jaurès argued: ‘Admettez un 
moment que cette Chambre du travail se substitue au Sénat actuel oligarchique et sans racines 
profondes dans le pays, et voyez quelle solide base vous donnez à la République, quelle impulsion 
décisive vous donnez à la démocratie, à l’égalité, à la justice, à la raison populaire.’342 In creating a 
Chambre du travail the Senate would obtain a new legitimacy in preparing the socialist solution for la 
question sociale. For Jaurès, the organisation of democratic society in associations and political groups 
was a new development that was of the same scale as the advent of universal suffrage. He believed it 
marked a revolution in French democracy and should therefore not be neglected.343 
These proposals for a new representation in the Senate should be seen in the context of the 
fin-de-siècle crisis of democracy in France.344 In the 1890s the debate about the deficit of representation 
was the topic of the day in France. In the words of Rosanvallon, there was a common feeling of a 
‘déception démocratique’.345 One publication that attracted the most attention was Charles Benoist’s 
La crise de l’État Moderne in the Revue des Deux Mondes.346 According to Benoist, the crisis of democracy 
was about the very engine of the modern state; universal suffrage. One of the main problems was that 
universal suffrage existed in an unorganised way, making it anarchistic. As a consequence, the 
organisation of the modern state had remained unorganised with a fortuitous, spontaneous and 
improvised character. Universal suffrage was designed as an expression of the sovereignty of the 
people, scattered in 10 million isolated electoral atoms.347 
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Benoist also found the solution for this problem in a new organisation of the Senate. One of 
the advantages would be that the Senate regained authority, credit and initiative without becoming a 
complete copy of the Chamber of Deputies. While the Chamber of Deputies reflected the votes of 
individuals, the Senate should represent the other side of ‘la vie nationale’ wich was ‘la vie collective’.348 
Local unions of all genres and categories would constitute this part of society: universities, tribunals, 
chambers of commerce, notaries, solicitors, etc.349 Benoist argued that profession was a form of 
identity in an anonymous society: ‘parce que la profession est ce qu’il y a de plus réel, de plus positif, 
de plus constant et de plus présent, de plus spécifique dans la vie sociale de l’homme.’350 Benoist 
believed that the only remedy for the decline of democracy was the representation of interests 
expressed in the Senate. Rosanvallon argues that Benoist’s ideas should not be qualified as a means to 
restrain the power of the number, but as a quest for a ‘superior democracy’.351 In addition, Rosanvallon 
remarks that the fact that such a moderate professor of constitutional history at Sciences Po became 
one of the foremost supporters of an organic system of representation clearly demonstrates how much 
the political culture had changed in France since the 1870s.352  
The debate was joined by even more eminent university professors like Léon Duguit and Émile 
Durkheim.353 As a matter of fact, Émile Durkheim had a great influence on Jaurès.354 Léon Duguit 
agreed that the representation of professional groups in the Senate would be the solution to the crisis 
of representation. What Duguit borrowed specifically from Durkheim was the idea that individuals 
were subjected to laws because they were part of an integrated community whose rules derived their 
obligatory force from social interdependence. The Senate had a future making this idea concrete. 355 
Léon Duguit argued that it was impossible not to see the immense reaction that had been 
brought about in the last twenty years against the individualist doctrines of the French Revolution.356  
He observed what he called a ‘gigantesque mouvement associationniste’ that manifested itself in unions 
of workers, industrials and farmers. Politicians and legislators could simply not remain indifferent to 
this development that was everywhere: ‘Les choses marchent vite en ce pays de France; et le temps 
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n’est peut-être pas loin de nous, où l’individualisme à outrance né de la Révolution ne sera plus qu’un 
souvenir.’357 According to Rosanvallon the article of Léon Duguit is symptomatic for the radical 
political and intellectual change in French society at the end of the nineteenth century. The intellectual 
and political world in France was submerged by a curiosity for constitutional issues.358  
Although universal suffrage was not directly contested, it is clear that more people began to 
see its limits. This idea that universal suffrage could not sufficiently represent all elements in society 
and that democracy had to be organised had been expressed before. It was Duc de Broglie who in 
1873 had asked the National Assembly ‘mais le nombre est-il tout dans la société?’359. Twenty years 
later the same question was asked. And again, the Senate was perceived as a tool to achieve a certain 
organisation of democracy. Thus, in the late nineteenth century crisis of democracy the Senate was not 
only seen as the problem, but also as a possible solution. 
However, from October 1897 onwards the debate about the Senate was completely 
overshadowed by the Dreyfus affair. In 1898 anti-parliamentary leagues manifested themselves, putting 
the parliamentary Republic in danger. The moderate republican Waldeck-Rousseau formed a 
‘government of republican defence’ which also included Radicals and socialists. The renewed threat to 
the parliamentary Republic provoked a throwback to a republican concentration in defence of the 
regime.360  
Historian Robert Elliot Kaplan has pointed at the fact that in this coalition the Radicals and 
socialists were now forced to drop their demand for the income tax, and also diminish their discontent 
with the Senate. Kaplan has argued that the Dreyfus affair was not the real crisis that menaced the 
Republic; it was the crisis provoked by the fall over the Bourgeois government. Kaplan’s argument is 
that politics in the 1890s were dominated by the haute bourgeoisie’s fear for democracy. The wealthy, 
who lived from their incomes, were terrified by this fiscal reform and mobilised every possible measure 
to protect themselves against the revolutionary situation.361 Kaplan portrays Waldeck-Rousseau’s 
objective as the transformation of the Third Republic into a regime in ‘which the wealthy few would 
not be overwhelmed by the many of democracy’.362 Kaplan proposes a very significant revision of the 
portrait of French politics in the 1890s, but reduces the complexity of this period to a successful 
conspiracy of Waldeck-Rousseau and the haute bourgeoisie. Nevertheless, his argument does offer a 
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rather convincing explanation for the fact that the Radical-socialist call to reform the Senate -which 
had been cried for so loudly at the Place de la République in 1896- was abandoned. 
What is certain is that the episode of the Dreyfus affair brought an end to fundamental debates 
about the role of the Senate in French democracy. First of all because they had no priority anymore, 
but also because the Senate was, once again, cherished as an effective protection of the Republic. On 
4 September 1899, on demand of the President of the Republic, the Senate was for the second time 
after the Boulanger trial constituted as a High Court of Justice. This time it was to sentence Paul 
Déroulède, president of the Ligue des Patriotes, an important anti-dreyfusard organization. Déroulède 
had attempted a coup d’état with other plotters. Most of them were found guilty by the Senate and 
exiled for five years. Paul Smith concludes that ‘the Senate had once more performed its duty with 
determination’363 and that ‘between the trials of Boulanger and Déroulède the Senate had found its 
place. Abolition was pushed to the political margins and even reform of the upper chamber became a 
non-starter.’364  
In this context one should see the proposal to elect the senators by universal suffrage submitted 
by the vice-president of the Ligue des Patriotes Albert Gauthier de Clagny on 2 December 1898. The 
nationalist deputy indicated that every time when this proposition had been made in the past years by 
the Radicals, it had not succeeded because of the long parliamentarian procedures. This was only to 
the benefit of the politicians who wished to remain the status quo. He added that every time when the 
delicate matter of the Senate was discussed, the government placed itself in between and forced the 
Chamber in the position to vote in support of or against the government. According to Clagny, this 
situation made it difficult to express one’s real opinion and discuss the reform of the Senate and the 
principles of the republican democracy.365 Clagny’s proposal might have been opportunistic and meant 
to damage the citadel of the republican regime he opposed, his frustrated argument nevertheless 
exposed the truth. His exposé perfectly illustrated that the debate about the Senate was not only highly 
influenced by national political developments, but also by the complicated parliamentarian procedures 
and power games. These factors prevented an open discussion about the utility of a Senate in French 
democracy. Ironically, the Chamber did not adopt Clagny’s bill and sent it to the commission du suffrage 
universel, and again, the commission never examined the proposal and a report was never presented.366 
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The socialist deputy René Viviani announced to vote in favour of Clagny’s proposition because 
it was a beginning of the realisation of the reforms that were demanded by democracy. But the deputy 
from the Seine -who defended the working class- made clear that their real objective was the complete 
abolition of the obstacle that stood in the way on the road of reforms that were demanded by 
democracy.367 The Radical-socialist deputy Émile Morinaud also declared: ‘Nous avons un 
commencement de satisfaction ; notre but c’est la suppression du Sénat. (bruit)’368 These statements 
once more confirm that in the last years of the nineteenth century, socialists definitively took over the 
Radical role as main criticizer of the Senate. In the twentieth century this trend would continue. 
 
France compared to Belgium and The Netherlands 
Contrary to France, the debate about the Senate in late nineteenth century-Belgium took place at one 
fixed moment. In 1893 the Belgian constitution was revised for the first time. Because of the pressure 
of the labour organisations a hybrid form of universal male suffrage was implemented; the so called 
plural vote system.369 This change of the electoral system also had consequences for the Senate, which 
therefore constituted the second main issue on the agenda for reform.370 There was quite some debate 
about the question what kind of role the Senate should have in the new constitutional framework, but 
the Senate itself wasn’t contested anymore. The in 1830 heavily debated Senate had found solid ground 
in 1893.371  
This was mainly because of the fact that limited suffrage brought about a conservative ruling 
elite who saw no reason for change. This becomes clear from the fact that the legitimacy of the Belgian 
upper house in 1893 was found in a slightly different reason than in 1830. Whereas in 1830 the 
arguments for the Senate were meant to balance the constitution, in 1893 the government was 
confronted with the upcoming democratic movement that needed to be controlled. According to Jean-
Pierre Nandrin the fear for democracy was very strong among politicians.372  
Despite the fact that nobody asked for the abolition of the Senate, the deliberations about the 
reform of the Senate were long, complicated and very confusing. Nandrin explains this longevity of 
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the discussion on the basis of the fact that a two-third majority was a strict juridical condition for every 
article of the revision.373 The result was a compromise. It was decided to introduce a new category of 
senators who were indirectly elected by the provincial councils, a system comparable to the French 
system. The second element of change was that the tribute conditions for the directly elected senators 
changed slightly, and the minimum voting age went from 25 to the age of 30. But according to Nandrin, 
these measures had no real impact whatsoever.374 It was estimated necessary to differentiate the Senate 
in order to make it an efficient compensation versus the chamber that became more democratic. With 
much regret Professor Herbert Speyer concluded that despite the endless discussions, the Senate had 
changed only slightly; 1893 was just a repetition of what the National Congress had done in 1830.375   
The system of professional representation, which was debated in France, found its origins in 
Belgium. In 1893 propositions were made to introduce this system for the Belgian Senate. Especially 
liberals and Catholics defended the idea to elect the senators directly by groups of science, agriculture, 
industry and commerce. The motivation behind the idea was to fill the Senate with men of experience 
who were capable of solving economic problems and introduce social bills. But every time when this 
idea was presented, it was rejected by both the Chamber and the Senate.376 The legal expert Adolphe 
Prins, an important pioneer of the theory of representation of interests, argued that it was urgent to 
find the right formula for a peaceful democracy which was able to resist the tyranny of the number.377 
The reasons for the popularity of this system were slightly different compared to France. In France 
the system was presented as a solution for a democratic crisis which was the result of a disenchantment 
of the firm believe in universal suffrage. In Belgium, where universal suffrage was not yet established, 
politicians were looking for a way to find a new legitimization for the Senate which would make it 
function as an efficient barrier against the ongoing democratisation of society. 
Despite this difference, the whole of Europe looked at what happened in Belgium. The reform 
of 1893 speeded up and crystallised a combination of ideas and positions that were in the zeitgeist.378 
The French political commentator Joseph Barthélémy described Belgium as ‘the political laboratory of 
Europe’.379 Abbé Lemire, the priest from French Flanders, made no secret of the fact that he took 
Belgium as an example: ‘Je suis flamand et je conflue à la Belgique et au système belge’.380 Charles 
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Benoist also admitted that he had borrowed the idea from Adolphe Prins.381 This indicates that there 
clearly was an exchange of ideas about this particular system between France and Belgium. It confirms 
the development sketched by Rosanvallon that in the last decade of the nineteenth century French 
politicians became less reluctant to look over their border for foreign examples, and no longer 
considered themselves as the carriers of modern democracy; pride made place for modesty and 
uncertainty.382 Although the idea of representation of interests was not endorsed in 1893, the idea to 
elect the Senate with this suffrage remained very popular in Belgium and was one of the main elements 
that would pop up again during the debates of the second revision of the Belgian constitution in 1921.  
The Dutch constitution was also subjected to a reform in 1887. Just like in Belgium nobody 
was for the abolition of the Senate.383 The Dutch liberals had been sceptical about the usefulness of 
the upper house, but in 1887 they concluded that the Eerste Kamer had not resisted that much as they 
had feared it would and that it had actually done a rather good job. However, there was also an 
opportunistic reason for the liberals to moderate their language about the Senate. From 1870 onwards, 
the number of liberals in the Senate increased strongly, to the detriment of the royalist-conservative 
members.384 So one could argue that the Dutch liberal attitude had some similarities with the French 
Radicals. The liberals had only occasionally expressed some criticism on the Senate when a finance bill 
was rejected or when it brought down liberal ministers or cabinets, but they did not withstand the role 
the Senate played.385 
Another reason for the liberals to suddenly cherish the Senate had to do with the fact that the 
revision of the constitution in 1887 expanded the suffrage conditions for elections of the Dutch House 
of Representatives. According to Bert van den Braak this had the consequence that many Dutch 
liberals regarded the Senate as a useful counterweight against this democratic reform. Suddenly, some 
liberals even honoured the useful work of the Senate.386 This demonstrates that the impact of the 
extension of the suffrage in both Belgium and The Netherlands had the effect that the elites held on 
the Senate as a bastion of their influence. In the Low Countries, the upcoming movement of 
democratisation confirmed the legitimacy of the Senate. In France this was different. Because of the 
fact that the process of democratisation had taken such a huge lead in France, the political relations 
were completely different from other European countries. This had made it possible that while the 
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conservative liberals were defending a Senate in Belgium and The Netherlands against the upcoming 
democratic wave, at the same time in France democrats who had attacked the Senate, now defended 
it for their own political interest. 
A similarity between the French and the Dutch case is that the electoral system of the Dutch 
Senate was a debated topic in the second half of the nineteenth century. Especially liberals like 
Thorbecke and Van Houten, but also members of the Calvinist Anti-revolutionaire Partij De Savornin-
Lohman and Kuyper, expressed their discontent with the senatorial elections. They criticised the fact 
that because of the severe conditions for eligibility only the conservative ‘money-aristocracy’ seated in 
the Senate. Because of the fact that the Dutch House of Representatives was not elected by universal 
suffrage but by limited suffrage, the critics stated that the financially strong already had enough 
influence in politics and that the Senate gave them a superfluous privilege.387 Besides, some politicians 
regarded the election of the Senate via the provinces far from logical.388 
Now that the braking function of the Senate was revalued by the Dutch liberals, other 
politicians protested against it, mainly from the Anti-Revolutionaire Partij. It was De Savornin Lohman 
who argued that he did not believe that the House of Representatives ever took overhasty decisions.389 
This is rather remarkable since the name of his party ‘anti-revolutionair’ meant ‘against the principles 
of the French Revolution’. This demonstrates that the fear for a revolutionary Chamber was much less 
embedded in the Dutch political culture than in France or in Belgium.  
Just as in those countries, the system of representation of interest had supporters in The 
Netherlands. The initiative came from the anti-revolutionaries Kuyper and De Savornin Lohman. De 
Savornin Lohman wished the Senate to be elected by chambers of commerce, universities, churches 
and labour unions.390 But these proposals did not make it through. In The Netherlands though, there 
was no such thing as a crisis of democracy like in France. So the reasons for the fact that politicians in 
The Netherlands and Belgium were interested in the system of representation of interests, were 
different from France. But apparently, they all felt the same urge to find a new -more logical or more 
democratic- way to elect the upper house and reinforce its legitimacy. 
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Chapter 3   1900-1914: between principles and pragmatism 
 
 
At the end of the nineteenth century France witnessed the emergence of the organisation of politics 
in political groups. The law of 1901 on the freedom of association finalized this development and 
provided a framework for the creation of political parties. The emergence of political parties caused 
the end of parliamentary democracy in its original form. Besides, according to Bernard Manin at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, reflexions on ‘the crisis of parliamentarism’ multiplied in France.391 
Representative government had experienced a change. This change was also noticeable in the debates 
about the Senate. 
In 1898, the Radicals had obtained a majority in the Senate. However, for some time Radical 
deputies continued to present very modest projects in favour of the reform of the Senate. In the period 
between 1900-1904, two texts were presented, but without any result.392 From 1906 onwards, without 
any official or explicit statement, the Radical politicians began to abstain from presenting propositions 
for changing the electoral system of the Senate. For over more than twenty years these proposals had 
been the expression of their fundamental anti-senatorial position. The reasons for this ‘Radical silence’ 
had already become noticeable in the 1890s, as we have seen in the previous chapter. But now, it 
became even more obvious.  
The attitude of the outspoken Radical Camille Pelletan perfectly demonstrates the evolution in 
Radical thought. Pelletan -who had who shouted ‘A bas le Sénat’ in the in the crowd at Place de la 
République in 1896- explained in 1909 that because of the fact that democracy had entered the Senate, 
there was no reason to attack it anymore: ‘Le Sénat, ayant été, malgré les obstacles accumulés par les 
monarchistes de l’Assemblée nationale, pénétré par l’esprit républicain, il n’y a pas de raison de le 
combattre.’393 For the Radicals, the Senate was not a question of fundamental principle anymore. The 
upper house had become compatible with democracy because they had conquered the majority in it, 
even though the Senate still blocked progressive reforms.  
Now that the Radicals had obtained a majority in the Senate, the abolition of the institution 
had finally become within reach, in theory. But their political strategic interests restrained them from 
taking action. When Pelletan was asked the question why the Radicals had dropped their age-old 
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demand for the electoral reform of the Senate, he answered that France should look at the example of 
Great Britain. For Pelletan, the British had demonstrated perfectly how to accommodate institutions 
that are theoretically unacceptable. They had succeeded in transforming one of the most aristocratic 
countries into a democracy. This country had also institutions that were undeniably in contradiction 
with modern principles, but it reformed them when movements of progress demanded to. Now that 
the French Senate was penetrated by the democratic spirit it was not anymore the roadblock against 
reforms it used to be, Pelletan asserted. Therefore there was no need to reform the constitution 
anymore either: ‘Tant que nous conserverons l’espoir de trouver en lui un collaborateur, nous 
n’embarrasserons pas la politique d’une question constitutionnelle.’394   
There was another reason why the discussion about the Senate receded into the background. 
In the first ten years of the twentieth century, the attention was drawn away from the Senate because 
all eyes were focussed on the debate about the election of the Chamber of Deputies by proportional 
representation. The idea of representation of interests was overshadowed by the popularity of this new 
concept. The position of Charles Benoist is symbolic for this shift. In 1895 he had imposed himself as 
the champion of the organisation of democracy by the representation of interests. Ten years later, in 
1905, he would be the president of the Commission du suffrage universel, and presented in the Chamber of 
Deputies a report pleading for the proportional representation. This would be the start of a long debate 
on this issue.395  
While in the eyes of the Radicals the Senate had become ‘democratic’, for the socialists it was 
not yet democratic enough. In July 1906 a project was presented by a group of socialist and Radical-
socialist deputies to elect the senators by universal suffrage. The enclosed exposé des motifs asserted that 
because the political debate was so much focussed on the proportional representation, the reform of 
the Senate had simply been forgotten, although the latter was considered to be a much more important 
reform. It was explicitly specified that the abolition of the Senate would be the ultimate solution. 
However, this was seen as practically impossible: ‘La suppression de la Haute Assemblée serait 
évidemment la solution radicale par excellence; mais elle nécessiterait une révision de la constitution 
qu’il semble difficile d’obtenir en ce moment.’396 The election of the senators by universal suffrage was 
considered to be indeed far more modest but just as efficient and would very rapidly change the spirit 
of the majority in the Senate.397  
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 But there was a positive comment on the Senate too. The socialists stated that the upper house 
had ‘given much satisfaction to democracy’ in voting very rapidly and without any problems the bill 
on the separation of churches and state in 1905. However there was still a lot of improvement needed 
on the level of social reforms for the working classes: ‘En repoussant systématiquement la plupart des 
lois ouvrières, en ajournant tout au moins indéfiniment leur mise en vigueur, il a clairement montré 
qu’il s’opposerait de tout son pouvoir à l’évolution normale de notre société. Il est donc indispensable, 
si nous ne voulons pas faire œuvre vaine, de rechercher dès maintenant le remède à apporter à ce 
déplorable état de choses.’398  For the socialists, the Senate was above all a conservative obstacle for 
the realisation of their political programme. 
The Senate, and especially the Radical fraction in the Senate, protested vigorously against the 
system of proportional representation. On 18 March 1913 it was no surprise that the ‘Radical’ Senate 
rejected the proposal for this system that had gained a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. The result 
was that the government of the socialist Aristide Briand was forced to resign. This incident was the 
reason for political commentator Joseph Bartélémy to write an article about ‘les résistances du Sénat’. 
The article is a clear and critical analysis about the behaviour and history of the Senate of the Third 
Republic. Barthélémy believed that the Senate had been spared in comparison to the Chamber of 
Deputies: ‘L’attention publique est concentrée sur la Chambre des députés, et, quoi que fasse le 
Parlement, c’est la Chambre des députés que l’on s’en prend.’399 According to Barthélémy, the public 
was simply not interested in the Senate; this silent chamber of wisdom. However, the Senate’s vote of 
18 March had made the Luxembourg palace the talk of the day again and caused a resurgence of the 
debate about the legitimacy of the Senate and its election mode.400 The Journal des débats quite aptly 
described it as ‘logical’ that when the Senate was imposing its will on the Chamber concerning the 
election mode of the latter, the deputies would in return bring up the old debate about the election 
mode of the Senate.401  
Ironically the Radicals now owed a large part of their influence in politics to the indirect 
electoral system of the Senate they had always disputed. The reaction of Radical politicians to the fall 
of the Briand government was, perhaps not so surprisingly anymore, very loyal to the Senate’s 
authority. Le Radical wrote: ‘Nous espérons, pour l’avenir du grand parti réformateur, que tous les 
républicains…sauront incliner leurs préférences personnelles devant l’arbitrage de la Haute 
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Assemblée…Son rôle constitutionnel et les services éminents qu’elle a rendu à la République lui 
donnent toute l’autorité nécessaire pour être écoutée…L’arbitrage du Sénat républicain devra être le 
ralliement de toutes les gauches.’402 The Senate’s arbitrary role in the Boulanger crisis and the Dreyfus 
affair were now explicitly used by the Radicals as a legitimization for their changing position vis-à-vis 
the Senate. This idea was more than confirmed in Le Radical of the next day: ‘Le Sénat tient dans ses 
mains les destinées de la république… Jamais son rôle de gardien de nos institutions n’est apparu plus 
fort.’403 Gambetta’s defence of the Senate as a Grand Conseil des Communes de France -which the Radicals 
had never accepted- was now opportunistically used as an extra argument by themselves: ‘Il est le grand 
Conseil des Communes de France. En lui, les assemblées provinciales, les conseils municipaux, les 
conseils généraux ont mis leur confiance. Nous nous inclinerons tous devant l’arbitrage du Sénat 
républicain.’404 In Georges Clemenceau’s L’Aurore it was now stated very clearly that the abolition of 
the Senate was no part anymore of the Radical programme: ‘Parler de la suppression du Sénat, de 
bouleversement dans le mode d’élection de ses membres, c’est là une campagne dangereuse et tout à 
fait inutile.’405  
Joseph Barthélémy witnessed this process and concluded that it was because of their resistance 
against the electoral reform of proportional representation that the Radicals suddenly defended the 
Senate with so much energy. Barthélémy made a sharp analysis: ‘Les radicaux ont crié : sus au Sénat ! 
Tant que le Sénat leur a fermé ses portes ou a résisté à leurs exigences ; ils crient aujourd’hui : Vive le 
Sénat ! Parce que le Sénat est comme eux hostile à la réforme électorale. Et l’attitude des modérés est 
strictement correspondante : ils défendent le Sénat contre les attaques radicales au sujet de sa politique 
de résistance aux réformes démocratique ; ils attaquent le Sénat, défendu par les radicaux lorsqu’il s’agit 
de la réforme électorale.’406  
Léon Bourgeois, in his conflict with the Senate, had provoked a last wave of Radical Senate 
contestation. But this was now over. Barthélémy listed some examples of this Radical opportunism. 
He gave the example of the Radical politician Antonin Dubost, who had published a book in which 
he had explicitly attacked the Senate, but he eventually became the president of the Luxembourg palace 
in 1906. Barthélémy cited Camille Pelletan who asserted that it was much more urgent to work on 
social reforms than to waste energy on constitutional issues. Pelletan argued that the Senate could have 
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a future in the Republic, but only on the precondition that the institution would not make the social 
reforms impossible.407 The Radicals thus became very pragmatic in their resistance vis-à-vis the Senate. 
According to Barthélémy, the socialists had the most constant attitude. They were loyal to their 
principles because they had never ceased to demand the abolition of the Senate.408 The rise of socialism 
was an important development in French politics in the first two decades of the nineteenth century. 
At the eve of the First World War, the French socialist party, SFIO (Section Française de 
l’Internationale Ouvrière), had nearly doubled in size since 1906. In their party programme the SFIO 
was in favour of the revision of the constitution and the creation of new political institutions because 
they were not suited to improve the conditions of the working class. They wanted a single assembly 
elected by proportional representation.409    
The socialists believed that the election of the Senate was in contradiction to the very principles 
of democracy, because it had excessive powers which it used against universal suffrage. Because a 
modification of the constitution -which meant the reunion of the Congress- did not belong to the 
realistic possibilities, the socialists would also aim at making its recruitment more democratic simply 
by passing a bill, just as the Radicals had done.410 The constitutional reform of 1884 was still working 
as an effective life-insurance for the Senate. 
In reaction to the Senate’s refusal of proportional representation, Jaurès’ newspaper L’Humanité 
published an article with the original title ‘À bas le Sénat!’ written by Adéodat Compère-Morel, a 
socialist deputy from the Gard. Morel pointed at a very important element in the survival of the Senate. 
He stated that the Senate’s fortune was that the existence of the institution was often forgotten: 
‘Personne ne pensait plus a cette Assemblée, dont le principal rôle consiste à ne rien faire.’411 He 
attacked the senators as lazy politicians who were paid for doing nothing, and that was precisely the 
reason why nobody ever heard anything from the Luxembourg palace. However, the recent vote of 
the Senate against proportional representation had changed the situation because it remembered 
everyone that the Senate existed: ‘il nous oblige à demander au pays si cette existence est bien utile, 
bien necessaire!’412  Morel described the Senate’s election system as corrupt, because the majority of 
the senators were not elected for their ideas and principles, but as the result of an old boys network. 
Morel believed that the election of senators was a business of wheeling and dealing that had nothing 
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to do with democracy. The candidates who were running for the senatorial election would bribe the 
local administers by paying the renovation of public buildings, such as schools and churches. Herewith 
their (re)election would be assured and they would sleep safe and sound in their fauteuils for the next 9 
years: ‘Tout le monde sait d’ici la valeur de cette Assemblée, où l’éternelle consigne est de ronfler.’413 
From now on, the socialists should see it as their duty to signal the uselessness and the danger of the 
Senate: ‘Inutilité, puisqu’il ne siège pas, puisqu’il ne discute pas, puisqu’il ne travaille pas. Danger, 
d’abord parce qu’il se dresse contre le suffrage universel, et ensuite parce que sa haine contre le monde 
du travail, haine sans borne, sans limite, se manifeste dans son hostilité aux lois sociales.’414 Morel called 
to re-ignite the spirit the Radical politicians had demonstrated in the past; ‘ces honnêtes républicains, 
de ces bons démocrates’. He condemned the lazy spirit of the Radicals of today who had been 
corrupted by power.415  
Maurice Alard, the famous socialist deputy from the Var, was a frequent contributor to 
l’Humanité. In March 1913 Alard was clearly furious about the audacity of the Senate to sweep aside 
the opinion of the Chamber. This insurrection of ‘les veillards sans mandat du Luxembourg’ was an 
unprecedented absurdity of the ‘constitution monarchique de 1875’.416 Therefore the moment had 
come to revise the constitution. This revision had to be republican and democratic, like the ‘former 
republicans’ Clemenceau, Rivet and Maurice Faure had demanded. According to Alard, these Radicals 
had -in forgetting the fundamentals of their programme- given the Senate the force it now used.417 
The French historian Gilles Le Béguec stated that one can hardly observe otherwise then that 
the socialists took over the heritage the Radicals had left behind in the 1880s.418 Nevertheless, Le 
Béguec noticed an interesting difference between them. The desire to revise the constitution of 1875, 
and in particular the attacks on the Senate was a very important factor in the Radical identity. This was 
not the case with the socialists. The Socialist Party, which first of all defended the working class, was 
only in a second place interested in matters of constitutional order. Besides, since its creation in 1905, 
the SFIO adopted a ‘vigilance républicaine’ in order to prevent to give too much ammunition to their 
adversaries which would help to discredit them.419 In other words, for the socialists, attacking the 
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Senate was just not worth the effort and would derive from their primary objective: settle la question 
sociale. 
This partly explains Jaurès’ paradoxical position about the Senate. In theory Jaurès expressed 
himself for abolition of the Senate, but in practice there was something that held him back. In his work 
l’Armée Nouvelle (1910) Jaurès addressed the question of the undemocratic nature of the Senate. Jaurès 
described that in all countries the Senate was an obstacle for democracy that needed to be removed: 
‘Aussi, quand dans tous les pays du monde le prolétariat lutte pour réaliser la démocratie politique 
absolue ; quand en France, il demande la suppression du Sénat rural et bourgeois (…) ; quand, en 
Angleterre, il exige l’abolition de la Chambre des Lords, forteresse de l’aristocratie terrienne et du 
conservatisme ; quand en Allemagne, il combat pour la démocratisation des Landstags et de 
municipalités et pour l’avènement du régime parlementaire et de la souveraineté du peuple. (…) C’est 
une œuvre révolutionnaire, car le prolétariat supprimera par-là les obstacles artificiels qui s’opposent à 
son mouvement et au progrès de la force socialiste qui tend à révolutionner le système social.’420  In 
his work Histoire socialiste de la Révolution française, Jaurès made an analysis of the debates about 
bicameralism during the French Revolution. Jaurès denounced the combination of a Second chamber 
and the royal veto as ‘la négation même de la démocratie’.421 
 Nevertheless, Jaurès had acknowledged in 1903 that the Senate rested on democracy, although 
it did not represent the complete democracy. The fact that the peasants were represented by the Senate 
was a good thing, but it excluded the parts of society for which Jaurès stood up for; the working classes: 
‘Le Sénat tient, par ses racines, à la démocratie mais il ne tient pas à toute la démocratie. Les communes 
rurales agissent fortement sur lui, et certes, c’est un grand bonheur que la démocratie paysanne puisse 
formuler ses revendications. Mais l’influence des forces industrielles et ouvrières sur le Sénat n’est pas 
proportionnée à leur valeur réelle.’422 Senators did not pay enough attention to the interests of the 
working class and the great problems that were created by industrial growth and the development of 
the proletariat.423 This explains why Jaurès was looking for another way to organise the Senate in the 
last decade of the nineteenth century. 
It also seems that Jaurès -a prominent defender of Dreyfus’ innocence- was impressed by the 
Senate’s actions against the republican patriots Boulanger and Déroulède: ‘Il y a vingt-cinq ans la 
forteresse de la réaction, il est devenu, contre la réaction, contre le boulangisme, contre le nationalisme, 
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contre le cléricalisme, et aussi contre le mélinisme, une forteresse de la République.’424 Although the 
Senate blocked the road for social reforms, Jaurès was glad to see the transformation of the Senate 
into a protector of the Republic. Jaurès believed that this positive development of the Senate had not 
been achieved by force but by legal actions, by the continuous influence of the infiltration of 
democracy in the upper house. The challenge now, Jaurès asserted, was to equally infiltrate the Senate 
with questions of an economic and social order.425 The fact that Jaurès personally was mild vis-à-vis 
the Senate provides another explanation for the fact that the French socialists in general were relatively 
moderate in their attacks on the Senate. 
Joseph Barthélémy was very sceptical about what the socialists would eventually undertake in 
order to get the Senate out of their way towards social reforms. Why would the socialists behave 
differently than the Radicals when they would conqueror the majority in the Luxembourg palace?: ‘Je 
crains cependant qu’il se laisse, lui aussi, aller à la loi jusqu’ici inéluctable qui veut qu’un parti proclame 
que la Révolution est accomplie, aussitôt qu’il triomphe!’426 Barthélémy concluded that none of the 
political parties have been sincerely loyal to their principles with regard to the Senate. Barthélémy here 
touched lightly on an important element that explains for a large part the Senate’s survival in the first 
half of the Third Republic. 
This opportunism was also very well tangible in the debate about proportional representation, 
which brought about a peculiar development described by Barthélémy: the moderate republicans took 
sides with the socialists against the Radicals. The moderates would never go as far as demanding the 
abolition of the Senate, but they did not hide their disaffection. They even began to demand the 
moderate reform of the Senate.427 In December 1912 for example, Henry Fleury-Ravarin, deputy of 
the Union Républicaine and a convinced proportionalist, presented a bill proposing to replace the 
senatorial delegates by the conseillers municipaux.428 Barthélémy eloquently described how the moderates 
had always defended the Senate against the attacks of the Radicals who had demanded democratic 
reforms. But now they attacked the Senate themselves, this time defended by the Radicals, because of 
the issue of electoral reform in the Chamber of Deputies. In this irony Barthélémy concluded that 
every time when the ‘counterbalance-element’ of the Senate was causing trouble for any party-
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programme of any political group; the upper house was attacked. Barthélémy added that this was 
nothing new, and not at all special for France.   
 
France compared to Belgium and The Netherlands  
During this period there were some similar developments in Belgium, the Netherlands and France. 
This had mainly to do with the rise of socialist parties which all encountered the opposition of the 
conservative upper house on the road to social reforms. The Belgian case is peculiar, and once more 
demonstrated how open minded one reflected about the position of the Senate. In Belgium the 
introduction of universal male suffrage formed the basis of the national reconciliation politics after the 
war. In the elections of November 1919 the Catholic Party had lost its majority and stood against a 
coalition of socialists and liberals who were determined to realise the democratisation of the electoral 
system and the Senate. This was realised with the revision of the constitution in 1921. The introduction 
of universal male suffrage and the system of proportional representation fundamentally changed the 
Belgian political landscape. The main question, at this moment of democratic evaluation, was what 
should become of the Senate. Just like in France, in Belgium many socialists preferred to abolish the 
Senate.429 The government of Charles De Broqueville was convinced that if the bicameral system was 
to be maintained, the reform of the Senate would be of vital importance. All parties agreed that, now 
universal men suffrage had been realised, the limited suffrage for the Senate was totally unacceptable. 
One question stood central: How should the Senate present itself in a democratic society? For 
Broqueville the key issue to investigate was to know ‘if the Senate, because of its origin and the way it 
was elected, would be able to maintain the same influence in the future.’430 
The main striking difference with the situation in France was that the Belgian Senate took 
initiative to prepare its own reform. This was partly in order to prevent the scenario of 1893 where 
senators were forced to accept last moment solutions. But more importantly, it was because of what 
had happened with the House of Lords in Great Britain. The Parliament Act in 1911 which settled the 
equality between the two chambers had stimulated the liberal senator Goblet d’Alviella to take the 
initiative to form a special working group to discuss the reform of the Belgian Senate. This commission 
offered a unique setting where all ideas were openly discussed; it had the character of a real think tank. 
Among its members were politicians of all colour, but also eminent men from outside the political 
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arena. They included well-known names of the time: professor Speyer, Errera and Smets from the 
Université Libre de Bruxelles. Adolphe Prins, president of the Permanente raad van Wetgeving. Professor van 
der Smissen of the Université de Liège and Professor Dupriez of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. 
The first session started with the question if the Senate should be preserved. There were some 
commission members who preferred the abolition of the Senate, but the majority believed a reform to 
be sufficient.431 The Senate did not have many enemies432, and it was considered to be a useful 
instrument, mostly for the reason summarised by Emile de Lavelye: ‘l’observation montre qu’avec 
deux Chambres on fait meilleures lois qu’avec une seule’.433 However, the commission unanimously 
agreed that the Senate could not be regarded anymore as an aristocratic or conservative institution 
which functioned as a brake or body of resistance: ‘cette conception ne s’accorde plus avec la structure 
actuelle de la société’.434  While in 1893 the Senate had gained in legitimacy as a brake on democracy, 
in 1921 the Senate was looking for a new function. The main question was how to give the Senate 
‘authority’ and ‘intellectual superiority’, but at the same time elect it in a democratic way. In any case it 
had to be prevented to make the upper house a replica of the lower house. In that case it would become 
‘un rouage inutile’ and have no legitimacy at all.435  
The Belgian commission admired the French Senate because of the authority it enjoyed in the 
legislative process, and the intellectual quality of the senators. Van der Smissen stated: ‘Nul ne le 
conteste, le Sénat de la République est la première assemblée politique de la France par l’intellectualité 
de ses membres, par l’autorité de raison de ses délibérations. Le niveau de l’assemblée est plus élevé 
que celui de la Chambre, précisément parce que le corps électoral est plus sélectionné.’436  Nevertheless, 
it was concluded that the French system, despite its success, would not be applicable in Belgium. It 
would mean the preponderance of the rural vote on the urban vote. The commission realised that 
public opinion in such an urban industrialised country as Belgium would simply not accept this. 437 The 
Belgians went on to look for other possibilities to give the Senate a legitimate voice in the legislative 
process. 
                                                          
431 Archief van de Belgische Senaat (ABS), Séance du mardi 8 juillet 1919, Commission d’Étude des Réformes à 
introduire dans l’Organisation du Sénat (Commission d’Études) 7.  
432 Georges Smets wrote that the existence of the Senate was not at stake: ‘Le sénat n’a pas d’ennemis’ in : Georges 
Smets, La réforme du Sénat (Brussels 1919) 10. 
433 ABS, Commission d’Étude, Réunion du 26 novembre 1919, 1.  
434 ABS, Rapport, 1. 
435 ABS, Commission d’Études, Réunion du 26 novembre 1919, 4. 
436 ABS, Commission d’Études, Réunion du 29 juillet 1920, 5. 
437 ABS, Commission d’Études, Réunion du mercredi 6 août 1919, 4. 
88 
 
 Just like in 1893 the system of professional representation was again extensively discussed. 
The idea was qualified by the commission as ‘très séduisant’.438 George Smets was without doubt one 
of Belgium’s most prominent defenders of the system. His arguments were very similar to the ones 
used by the French protagonists of the system. Smets argued that the advantages of this system lay 
first of all in the fact that it ended the domination of the number; quality votes would substitute for 
quantity votes.439 The professional groups were considered to be the components that constructed 
society. Therefore the représentation des intérêts would constitute a much more realistic reflection of 
society. The professional groups would substitute for the political parties; organisations that were 
regarded with much suspicion and whose abstract ideas sacrificed the reals interests of the people who 
composed them.440 But Smets was criticized that he was not able to provide specifications about how 
to bring this project -which was terrific in theory- into practice.441 The practical applicability was the 
stumbling-block and the commission concluded that the inconveniences predominated the 
advantages.442 There was also a fear that public opinion would not accept this system: ‘L’opinion 
publique ne tolérerait pas que la représentation des intérêts introduisit dans notre système électoral, 
avec plus de complication, un inégalité plus grande encore que le vote plural.’443  
There had to be found another way to recruit ‘des hommes de talent, de science et d’expérience’ 
which would give the Senate the necessary prestige. Speyer remarked that Senators did not necessarily 
have to be politicians. There were enough valuable men who, by their lack of eloquence or time, had 
not become a politician. One had to find a way to attract these ‘hommes de valeur étrangers à nos lutes 
de parti’ into the Senate.444 It was eventually found in the system of co-optation. 
After the commission had published its report, the propositions by the commission had to 
survive the democratic reality of the parliament.445 The Senate was prepared to take over the 
conclusions made by its own commission, however the Chamber was not. The result was an endless 
back and forth of proposals between the two chambers. A compromise was finally reached in October 
1921. The Senate would be composed of three different Senators: senators elected directly by universal 
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male suffrage, the provincial senators and the co-optated senators. Just like in France, the Belgian 
Senate had become democratic. 
Although the Belgian socialists were hostile vis-à-vis the Senate, they had to accept the 
democratic revision. They realised that their call for abolition did not find enough support. Besides, 
like in France, matters of constitutional order did not have the priority of the socialists. Jean-Pierre 
Nandrin indicates that they were so much preoccupied in obtaining universal suffrage that they were 
prepared to nearly every concession. Moreover, in 1921 some important social and economic reforms 
were also at stake which made the issue about the Senate much less important for the socialists.446 The 
reform of 1921 changed the Senate from a necessary balance into the seat of competence and 
specialists. This gave the Belgian Senate a new representativeness and legitimacy.447  
In The Netherlands, at the turn of the century, the Senate suddenly became contested by many 
political parties. In 1894 the Dutch social-democratic party, the Sociaal Democratische Arbeiders Partij 
SDAP included in its programme the abolition of the Senate. It was their charismatic leader Pieter 
Jelles Troelstra, who proposed to introduce universal male suffrage, abolish the Senate and replace it 
by a referendum. But these propositions were not discussed in a plenary session.448 Besides the 
socialists, the Dutch liberals too made propositions to reform the Senate. In 1903, the Liberale Unie 
proposed to make the requirements for eligibility for the Senate equal to those of the House of 
Representatives. The progressive liberal party Vrijzinning Democratsche Bond (VDB) also aimed to reform 
its election mode.449 The VDB presented an initiative to create a Chamber of Notables with City 
Council members, people who had held honorary office in the arts, sciences, and society life. But the 
proposition was much criticised for the fact that it would make the Eerste Kamer a copy of the Tweede 
Kamer. The bill was never treated in a plenary session and withdrawn in 1917.  
Like in Belgium, new propositions were made to organise the Senate in an organic way. In 
1908, the VDB deputy Willem Treub proposed the idea for a professional organisation of the Senate, 
where several sectors in society would get a fixed number of representatives, such as the workers 
sector, the agricultural sector, the trade sector and the sector of free professions.450 The idea for a 
professional Chamber became even more popular between 1913 and 1917 when the reform for 
universal suffrage was the main point on the Dutch political agenda. With the constitutional reform of 
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1917 the eligibility conditions of both chambers were synchronized. Just like in Belgium this caused 
some worries that the Senate would become a copy of the House of Representatives. A liberal 
amendment to elect the Senate by communal councils, bodies of surveyors of dikes and polders, and 
the trade councils did not get a majority in the House of Representatives though.451 
In 1918 the position of the Senate was on the political agenda again. The socialist leader Pieter 
Jelles Troelstra made an attempt to create a revolutionary situation in the Netherlands. For a moment, 
reforms like the abolition of the Senate appeared to be within reach. However, a revolution did not 
come, and the government proposals for the revision of the constitution did not include the reform 
of the Senate. After this revolutionary menace, the government stated that it believed that a single 
chamber system would be a threat for a ‘reliable state-structure’.452  
For the first time in The Netherlands, there were objections about the Senate’s contradiction 
to democracy. During the debates about the constitutional revision the social-democrats and VDB 
deputies demanded the abolition of the Senate because it was ‘in contradiction to the idea of the 
influence of the people in the legislative process’453. The conservative parties and the government could 
only answer in defence that there simply wasn’t anything better. The Catholic Party and the ARP feared 
for a revolutionary Chamber now universal suffrage was realised and preferred to maintain the 
Senate.454  Practically the Senate was maintained as a barrier against universal suffrage; an argument 
conservatives in France hadn’t dared to use so explicitly in the 1870s. 
In the Netherlands, it became clear that being in favour or against the Senate was also 
connected to political interests. The liberals stated that they wanted to maintain the Senate because 
this would allow other people than politicians to join the legislative work. However, they eventually 
voted for the abolition of the Senate because they feared that their plans to introduce proportional 
representation would not get a majority in the Senate, and therefore because of tactical motives 
preferred to remove this barrier.455 The SDAP and the VDB would until the Second World War 
continue to propose projects for a single chamber. But Bert van den Braak concludes that the difficult 
constitutional procedure made such a reform of the Senate very unlikely.456  
When comparing the Dutch and the Belgian situation to the French in the first two decades of 
the nineteenth century one can conclude that apart from the growing role of the socialists in contesting 
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the legitimacy of the Senate, the debate about the Senate was very different. Whereas in France the 
discussions about the Senate got locked up because of political interests and the fact that the Senate 
had become nearly untouchable, in the Low Countries the discussion gained a momentum. The most 
important reason for this was the instauration of universal suffrage in The Netherlands and Belgium. 
Discussions which had already taken place in France in the second half of the nineteenth century, now 
began to emerge in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
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Conclusion 
 
When Pierre Rosanvallon stated in his inaugural speech at the Collège de France that democracy is a 
permanent work in progress, and that the concrete forms it assumes are always the work of the 
historical circumstances,457 he could easily have pointed at the history of the French Senate to illustrate 
his statement. When investigating to what extend the Senate of the French Third Republic was 
considered to be compatible with democracy, the first thing to conclude is that the majority of 
politicians believed it was, and this was unique for the French situation where democracy was much 
more developed and accepted than in The Netherlands and Belgium. However, the fact that many 
French politicians did believe in the Senate’s democratic capabilities was highly dependent of the 
political circumstances. Specific national events and political opportunism were of decisive importance 
in the legitimation and contestation of the institution. The Senate was first of all the product of its 
time. Robert Gildea was right in arguing that one cannot understand the Third Republic without and 
understanding of the Senate. On the other hand one can equally not understand the Senate without 
looking at the history of the Third Republic.  
In the founding years of the Third Republic it was confirmed that legitimizing a second 
chamber as part of a mixed government had become a non-starter, hence this theory was completely 
abandoned by all political groups. Because of the fact that universal male suffrage had become 
inviolable, conservative liberals did not deny democracy and went out to look for possibilities to 
organise it. Orléanists like Broglie had a critical judgement on the ‘tyranny of the number’ and wanted 
a Senate in order to represent their own interests. Liberal republicans such as Édouard de Laboulaye 
were in favour of a democratically elected Senate in order to guarantee the conservative character of 
the Republic. Such a Senate, to the model of the United States, would provide stability and security 
because it worked as an insurance, not against democracy, but against revolutionary situations or a new 
Bonaparte.  
Following the republican tradition, the Radicals remained very hostile to the Senate because it 
was in contradiction to the Jacobin principles of democracy. They argued that a Senate would split the 
national sovereignty, and violate the will of the people. Léon Gambetta agreed that universal suffrage 
should not be opposed and was therefore hostile to Broglie’s Orléanist Senate. But there are manifold 
indications that Gambetta’s ideas were more modest than his words and that the leader of the 
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Republicans was not against bicameralism by principle. Therefore his initial hostility vis-à-vis the 
institution should be taken with a pinch.  
Since it was already clear in 1873 that there would be a Senate, the republicans tried to make 
the upper house as democratic as possible and mould it according to their wishes. The result was a 
very inventive chamber which was, according to the republicans, not only compatible with democracy, 
but also constituted an instrument for the promotion of democratic values in the whole of France. 
The Senate that was created served republican interests because the democratization, political 
education and activation of the backward French countryside were of their primary concern in order 
to make universal suffrage actually work in favour of them. The activation of communal politics, 
rallying the French peasants to the Republic and incorporate them into the nation, all went hand in 
hand. For this reason, the creation of the Republican Senate fits neatly in the context of the republican 
doctrine of municipalism, and therefore this research provides an argument in support of Sudhir 
Hazareesingh’s work. 
The fact that the Senate would be compatible with democracy for many republicans is partly 
clarified when one takes into consideration that the republican doctrine had become much less 
dogmatic under the Second Empire. However, the fact that after the disaster of l’année terrible the 
Republic became Furet’s prudent, conservative ‘republic of the centre’ does not provide a sufficient 
explanation for the adoption of a bicameral system. The defeat against the Prussians also led to an 
understanding among republicans of the necessity to unify France -reconcile Paris with the provinces- 
and stimulate the building of a national spirit. The Senate played a very important role in this nation 
building project. This leads to the conclusion that the Senate itself was not the price to pay in order to 
save the Republic, but it were the sénateurs inamovibles who formed the ugly spot on Gambetta’s Grand 
Conseil des Communes de France, and was therefore the only real concession the republicans had to make. 
Annelien De Dijn is correct in pointing at the fact that the Senate of the Third Republic was 
legitimised as a representation of the elite, as an alternative for the power of the number, as a necessary 
balance. However, this legitimation only reflects the arguments used by the conservative liberals, and 
it would be incorrect to claim that these considerations explain that the Third Republic eventually 
obtained the Senate it got. The republicans -who were certainly not looking for a balance in a second 
chamber- would never accept such an institution formulated against universal suffrage; they succeeded 
in creating their own Senate which served their specific interests.  
Those who were still not convinced about the democratic capabilities of the Senate were the 
Radicals. Since they considered universal suffrage as the precondition for a good functioning 
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democracy, the election of the Senate by indirect suffrage was simply intolerable. Because the Senate 
was still associated with aristocracy and oligarchy -and because it blocked reforms- the abolition of the 
Senate was a central element in the programme of the Radical Party in the 1880s. However, there was 
a difference between wish and reality. Without a majority in the Senate the Radicals stood very little 
chance to realise abolition, especially after the reform of 1884. 
The great turning point was the Boulanger crisis. General Boulanger became the popular 
mouthpiece of the Radical discontent with the Senate; the very symbol of the constitution of 1875. 
Because of the fact that the abolition of the upper house was a very specific demand of the Boulangist 
movement, it was in actual fact more ‘anti-senatorial’ than ‘anti-parliamentarian’. It should also get 
more emphasis that as a consequence of this senators were directly threatened, and it was therefore no 
surprise that the Senate resisted and dealt the final blow to the Boulangist menace. This turned out to 
be an enormous strategical success for the survival of the Senate in the republican regime. When the 
Grand Conseil des Communes de France risked to lose its glory, the Senate became cherished as the Citadelle 
de la République. For the republicans, the Senate did not so much provide a balance, but rather a security 
in the parliamentary regime. 
When the Radicals gained more influence in the French political landscape, and especially in 
the Luxembourg palace, their democratic objections vis-à-vis the Senate came to stand in the way. 
They gained an interest in maintaining the status quo and therefore diminished their fundamental 
principle for abolition or reform. Although in their ideology the Senate was still not compatible with 
democracy, it now protected their political interests. As a consequence, the Radicals became 
opportunist republicans themselves.  
The crisis of democracy that wandered through France in the last decade of the nineteenth 
century led to an important debate about the Senate’s place in French democracy. The Senate was not 
only considered to be the problem, but for some it became a possible solution to escape the 
individualist representation which universal suffrage had brought about. As a consequence, the idea to 
construct a chamber in which ‘all elements of democracy’ were represented had more similarities with 
Broglie’s Grand Conseil des Notables than Gambetta’s Grand Conseil des Communes. The idea of 
representation of interests in the Senate was copied from Belgium, where the system was not seen as 
a remedy for the deficit of representation but as a protection against the upcoming democratic 
movement. But again, discussions about the democratic legitimacy of the French upper house were 
disrupted by the political circumstances and political interests connected to the Dreyfus affair. 
95 
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century the French socialists took over the Radical role as 
the main Senate-critics. Just like their colleagues in Belgium and The Netherlands, the French socialist 
criticism did not rest on democratic or institutional principles, but rather on the fact that the second 
chamber was an obstacle for the realisation of their political programme that asked for social reforms. 
The order of the day in politics made the discussions about the Senate move to the background. The 
resistance against the ‘silent chamber’ only flared up when the Senate resisted and blocked important 
reforms that were endorsed by the Chamber, such as the impôt sur le revenue in 1896 and the proportional 
representation in 1913. However, asking for the abolition of the institution that had protected the 
Republic seemed to be something a decreasing number of politicians were willing to burn their fingers 
on.  
The comparison of the French situation with the Belgian and the Dutch case has taught us that 
the circumstances under which the debates about the Senate took place differed strongly in each of 
these countries. The different nature of the debates was mainly caused by the unsynchronised speed 
of the process of democratisation. The strong establishment of universal suffrage made France unique 
and had brought much more progressive politicians into power than in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
The unique composition of the National Congress in Belgium of 1830 had made it possible that 
democratic anti-senatorial voices could be heard too. But these faded away when the limited suffrage 
brought back an elite that was interested in opposing the democratic movement. However, the 
openness with which the Belgians have evaluated the use of a Senate is striking in comparison to 
France. In Belgium a think tank such as the Bartolone-Winock-commission already existed in 1919.   
In the Netherlands politicians seemed much more indifferent to the question if the Senate was 
compatible with democracy and this was because democracy was associated with universal suffrage 
and this would only be realised in 1917. When the Dutch politicians put the Senate up for discussion, 
it was because they did not see the use of this extra chamber and considered it to be too expensive. 
The fear for a revolutionary lower house was almost non-existent, and only appeared with the growing 
influence of the socialists who contested the Senate for the same reason as their colleagues in France 
and in Belgium. The comparison has also emphasized that in France the position of politicians vis-à-
vis the Senate has been much more determined by the political circumstances, political interests and 
the fact that the strong position of the Senate in the French political landscape locked-up the debate. 
The reasons for the peculiarity of the French situation stand in relation with two typical aspects 
of the French political culture: the distrust for revolutions and the fear for caesarism. The Boulanger 
crisis and the Dreyfus affair demonstrated that France had not yet been cured from these dangers. The 
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fact that the Senate eliminated the menace of caesarism gave the Senate an extra legitimacy as the 
protector of the parliamentary democracy. It is perhaps no wonder that Charles de Gaulle, who has 
often been placed in the Bonapartist tradition by historians458, was frequently in conflict with the 
Senate.459 He wanted to abolish the upper house because he saw it as nothing more than the 
representation of rural France of the nineteenth century.460 One can hardly deny that De Gaulle was 
wrong in his conclusion. 
Political theory and constitutional law are often used to study the legitimacy of a second 
chamber in a democratic society. However, both in The Netherlands, in Belgium -but above all in 
France- politicians have very frequently changed their opinion about the Senate because of the 
historical circumstances. Gambetta, Clemenceau, and finally Jaurès have learned to accommodate the 
Senate with democracy because changes in the political landscape forced them to do so. The 
comparative method, although rather modestly applied in this research, has made the French political 
culture much less self-evident. In has demonstrated that in order to get a complete picture of the 
reasons behind the historical evolution of democracy it is not enough to merely study political theory, 
one should also look at the political practice. 
A telling illustration of this political practice is the position of the French socialists vis-à-vis 
the Senate. Since the beginning of the twentieth century this political group has delivered the most 
important Senate-critics. However, this criticism suddenly stopped between 2011 and 2014 when the 
Parti Socialiste -for the first time in its history- won the majority of seats in the Senate.461 Their 
fundamental criticism vis-à-vis this intolerable democratic anachronism suddenly fell silent. Having 
finally obtained a majority in the Assemblée nationale, the Senate and a socialist President of the 
Republic, the left did not use this opportunity to finish once and forever with this ‘anomalie 
démocratique’. This is precisely what Joseph Bartélémy had already sceptically predicted in 1913. Just 
like the Radicals in his time, the socialists of the twenty-first century had a political interest in using 
their majority in the Senate and put their democratic principles aside. Opportunism is of all times. The 
Senate may often be legitimized as a ‘chambre de réflexion’, but it is above all an instrument of political 
power. But this is an element the commission of Claude Bartolone -a high-ranked socialist- and Michel 
Winock has forgotten to indicate. 
                                                          
458 Winock, La France politique, 497. 
459 Jean Garrigues, Les hommes providentiels: Histoire d’une fascination française (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2012).  
460 Compte-rendu Groupe de travail sur l’avenir des institutions, Séance du 17 avril 2015. 
461 ‘Pour la première fois de son histoire, le Sénat bascule à gauche’, Le Monde, 25 September 2011. 
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